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In statutory interpretation, theorists have long argued that the U.S.
Congress is a “they,” not an “it.” Under this view, Congress is plural and
nonhierarchical, and so it is incapable of forming a single, institutional
intent. Textualists contend that this vision of Congress means interpreters
must move away from concerns about intent altogether, and that they instead
should speak in the register of textualism and its associated constitutional
values, such as notice and congressional incentivization.
However, even if legislators’ intentions never coalesce into an institutional
intent, a disaggregated-intent theory of legislation remains possible. Under
this theory, statutes are understood as accomplishing a transfer not of the
intent of a single legislature, but of a collection of individual legislators.
While this theory often has been overlooked or summarily dismissed, this
Article argues that it is theoretically viable, constitutionally defensible, and
in accord with prevailing notions of legislative authority.
Moreover, disaggregated-intent theory generates its own vision of
legislation and interpretation—one that can transform our understanding of
specific methods of statutory interpretation. To illustrate this, the Article
turns to intentionalism, showing how a different understanding of
intentionalist methodology emerges from an approach rooted in
disaggregated-intent theory. The result is a new vision of the strengths and
weaknesses of both intentionalism and its competitor methodologies.
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INTRODUCTION
The central debate in the field of legislation has persistently asked: which
method of statutory interpretation should courts use? In this debate, courts
and scholars have advocated on behalf of a variety of competing
methodologies, including intentionalism,1 purposivism,2 textualism,3 and
dynamic statutory interpretation.4 These approaches all have benefited from
storied pedigrees and high-profile adherents, and each arguably has had
moments of ascendancy in our legal history. For textualism, that moment is
now: textualist methodology plainly has gained significant traction with the
current U.S. Supreme Court.5 As a result, textualism has largely displaced
1. On the basic tenets of intentionalism, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE JR. ET AL., STATUTES,
REGULATION, AND INTERPRETATION: LEGISLATION AND ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF
STATUTES 301–04 (1st ed. 2014).
2. For a formative, influential articulation of purposivism, see generally HENRY M.
HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS: BASIC PROBLEMS IN THE MAKING AND
APPLICATION OF LAW (William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey eds., 1994); see also
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 318–49 (providing an overview of purposivist history and
theory).
3. For influential accounts of textualism, see generally Antonin Scalia, Common Law
Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the
Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 3
(Amy Gutmann ed., 1997); William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV.
621 (1990) (chronicling the rise of the new textualist movement); see also Frank H.
Easterbrook, Statutes’ Domains, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 533, 547 (1983); John F. Manning,
Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673, 685–89 (1997).
4. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA.
L. REV. 1479 (1986).
5. For a case that many have cited as marking the Court’s recent embrace of textualism,
see Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020). For examples of recent
interrogations into the premises of textualism, see generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. &
Victoria F. Nourse, Textual Gerrymandering: The Eclipse of Republican Government in an
Era of Statutory Populism, 96 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1718 (2021); Cary Franklin, Living Textualism,

2022]

DISAGGREGATING LEGISLATIVE INTENT

2223

the intentionalism that, in an earlier era, defined the Court’s approach to
statutory interpretation.6
This rise of textualist methodology has been propelled, in part, by
textualist arguments that intentionalism suffers from a variety of troubling
flaws.7 One such argument, and one that has proven especially durable,8
contends that the U.S. Congress and other legislatures lack the capacity to
form a collective institutional intent.9 In a 1992 article, Professor Kenneth
A. Shepsle distilled this argument into an oft-repeated phrase: “Congress is
a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”10 Intentionalism is a methodology designed to locate a
collective institutional intent, these critics explain, and so the methodology
is fundamentally misguided—a search for something that does not exist.11
As such, interpreters should reject it.12

2020 SUP. CT. REV. 119; Matthew Jennejohn et al., Hidden Bias in Empirical Textualism, 109
GEO. L.J. 767 (2021) (arguing that corpus linguistics tools generate sexist results); Shlomo
Klapper et al., Ordinary Meaning from Ordinary People (2020) (unpublished manuscript),
https://www.readcube.com/articles/10.2139%2Fssrn.3593917
[https://perma.cc/W8JUHHJN] (finding that textualist methodology does not track nonlawyer interpretive practices,
as textualists claim); Kevin Tobia et al., Statutory Interpretation from the Outside, 122
COLUM. L. REV. 213 (2022) (same).
6. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 302; see also infra Part I.
7. These include providing courts with too much leeway to choose their politically
preferred interpretation, see Scalia, supra note 3, at 36 (quoting Judge Harold Leventhal on
his view that legislative history allows a judge to “look over the heads of the crowd and pick
out [his or her] friends”), creating opportunities for unelected legislative staffers to manipulate
court decisions, see id. at 32–35; Hirschey v. Fed. Energy Reg. Comm’n, 777 F.2d 1, 7–8
(D.C. Cir. 1985) (Scalia, J., concurring) (arguing that deference to committee reports created
a system of “committee-staff prescription”), and failing to promote the legislative deals and
compromises that textualists view as the essence of the legislative process, see John F.
Manning, The Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2391 (2003) (describing
textualism as protecting minority factions’ constitutional prerogative “to insist on compromise
as the price of assent”).
8. See infra note 46 and accompanying text (tracing the argument back to Max Radin’s
famous 1930 article); infra note 77 and accompanying text (noting the return to this argument
by scholars in recent years).
9. See RICHARD EKINS, THE NATURE OF LEGISLATIVE INTENT 15 (2012) (“The sceptical
[sic] arguments all focus on the significance of the fact that the modern legislature is a group
of legislators.”); see also infra Part I (recounting the history of this argument).
10. Kenneth A. Shepsle, Congress Is a “They,” Not an “It”: Legislative Intent as
Oxymoron, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 239, 241–44 (1992). For authors repeating this phrase,
see Ryan D. Doerfler, Who Cares How Congress Really Works?, 66 DUKE L.J. 979, 1000
(2017) (noting “this slogan has come to be a truism that is accepted even by many who find
the ability to attribute legislative intent unproblematic”); Lisa Schultz Bressman & Abbe R.
Gluck, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical Study of Congressional
Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part II, 66 STAN. L. REV. 725, 737 (2014) (noting
“Kenneth Shepsle’s famous insight”); McNollgast, Positive Canons: The Role of Legislative
Bargains in Statutory Interpretation, 80 GEO. L.J. 705, 711 (1992).
11. See, e.g., Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretations of Law,
1989 DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (describing the search for intent as a “wild-goose chase”).
12. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Inside Congress’s Mind, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 1915
(2015) (“I thought it obvious [in light of intent skepticism] that fighting it out on
[nonintentional] terms was more desirable than taking on the seemingly fruitless task of asking
whether one interpretive method or another better captures Congress’s true ‘intent.’”).
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This critique has not gone entirely unanswered over the years.13
Institutional legislative intent, several have responded, is a coherent
concept—one that intentionalist courts deploy in a manner consistent with
everyday linguistic practice, such as when we attribute intentions to
corporations or governmental agencies.14 When courts claim to discover an
“intent of Congress” in a statute, these scholars conclude, the courts engage
in a justifiable act of pinpointing an intent that can rightly be attributed to a
multimember institution.15
Despite these responses, however, this critique—which Professor John
Manning has referred to as “intent skepticism”—has recently returned to
legislation scholarship.16 Its return was precipitated, in significant measure,
by a body of scholarship produced in the last decade that has chronicled the
inner workings of the modern Congress.17 These congressional studies (by
myself18 and others19) have illuminated real-world features of the
present-day Congress,20 and they have argued that those institutional features
have practical implications for canons and doctrines of statutory
13. See infra notes 70–71 (citing scholars responding to intent skepticism).
14. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes,
65 S. CAL. L. REV. 845, 859 (1992) (analogizing the corporate quality of legislatures to “other
large institutions such as businesses, labor unions, and government departments”).
15. See, e.g., Lawrence M. Solan, Private Language, Public Laws: The Central Role of
Legislative Intent in Statutory Interpretation, 93 GEO. L.J. 427, 428 (2005) (arguing “that it
makes perfectly good sense to speak of legislative intent” for a multimember legislature in
statutory interpretation).
16. See id. at 428 n.9.
17. As Part I explains, this movement is typically traced to a pair of 2013 articles by
Professors Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman. See infra note 73 and accompanying
text.
18. See generally Jesse M. Cross, The Staffer’s Error Doctrine, 56 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 83
(2019) [hereinafter Cross, Staffer’s Error Doctrine]; Jesse M. Cross, Legislative History in
the Modern Congress, 57 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 91 (2020) [hereinafter Cross, Legislative
History]; Jesse M. Cross, When Courts Should Ignore Statutory Text, 26 GEO. MASON L. REV.
453 (2018); Jesse M. Cross & Abbe R. Gluck, The Congressional Bureaucracy, 168 U. PA. L.
REV. 1541 (2020).
19. See generally, e.g., ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014); Abbe R.
Gluck, Comment, Imperfect Statutes, Imperfect Courts: Understanding Congress’s Plan in
the Era of Unorthodox Lawmaking, 129 HARV. L. REV. 62, 90 (2015); Abbe R. Gluck et al.,
Unorthodox Lawmaking, Unorthodox Rulemaking, 115 COLUM. L. REV. 1789 (2015); Abbe
R. Gluck & Lisa Schultz Bressman, Statutory Interpretation from the Inside—An Empirical
Study of Congressional Drafting, Delegation, and the Canons: Part I, 65 STAN. L. REV. 901
(2013) [hereinafter Gluck & Bressman, Statutory Interpretation I]; Jonathan S. Gould, Law
Within Congress, 129 YALE L.J. 1946 (2020); Victoria F. Nourse, A Decision Theory of
Statutory Interpretation: Legislative History by the Rules, 122 YALE L.J. 70 (2012); Jarrod
Shobe, Codification and the Hidden Work of Congress, 67 UCLA L. REV. 640 (2020); Jarrod
Shobe, Intertemporal Statutory Interpretation and the Evolution of Legislative Drafting, 114
COLUM. L. REV. 807 (2014); Ganesh Sitaraman, The Origins of Legislation, 91 NOTRE DAME
L. REV. 79 (2015); Bressman & Gluck, supra note 10; see also Victoria F. Nourse & Jane S.
Schacter, The Politics of Legislative Drafting: A Congressional Case Study, 77 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 575 (2002).
20. To capture real-world institutional features, many have relied on interviews with
congressional insiders. See, e.g., Cross & Gluck, supra note 18, at 1545; Cross, Staffer’s Error
Doctrine, supra note 18, at 85; Cross, Legislative History, supra note 18, at 95; Gluck &
Bressman, Statutory Interpretation I, supra note 19, at 905–06; Gould, supra note 19, at 1954.
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interpretation.21 By drawing this connection between legislative reality and
interpretive implication, this scholarship has—in the eyes of various intent
skeptics—marked an implicit return to intentionalist methodology.22 In
response to this work, several prominent scholars have revisited the
longstanding critique of collective legislative intent, arguing that it renders
intentionalism incoherent and thereby prevents the recent scholarship on
Congress from carrying any interpretive import.23
In a recent article, Professor Abbe Gluck and I offered one response to
these recent critiques.24 There, we observed unappreciated ways in which
Congress, through the use of its nonpartisan offices, has a greater ability to
act as a unitary institution than has been recognized.25 It is an argument that
likely could be extended to many partisan legislative products as well, which
are themselves the product of what legal philosophers might call the “nested
intentions” of the institution.26 Few materials that emerge from Congress
lack some sort of nested institutional pedigree.27
However, this Article pursues a different line of argument. It grows out of
a concern that, by responding in the manner that we have, institutional-intent
scholars have disputed the skeptical conclusion offered by our textualist
counterparts—but also have acceded to an initial premise. According to that
premise, statutory interpretation entails a binary choice: either search for a
collective institutional intent, or discard the concept of intent altogether.28
This Article challenges that binary premise. Even if legislators’ intentions
never coalesce into a single institutional intent, it explains, it remains possible
to view statutes as accomplishing a transfer of disaggregated intent: not the
intent of a single legislature, but of a collection of competing individual
legislators. This Article examines and defends the vision of legislation (and
interpretation) that emerges from this approach—one that it labels the
disaggregated-intent theory of legislation.29

21. See Cross, Staffer’s Error Doctrine, supra note 18, at 124–25 (proposing a doctrine
for staff errors); see also Cross & Gluck, supra note 18, at 1674–79 (reviewing proposed
interpretive canons).
22. See Manning, supra note 12, at 1935 (observing that Gluck and Bressman’s study
“plainly invoke[s] intentionalist reasoning”).
23. See id.; see also Doerfler, supra note 10, at 998–1000.
24. See Cross & Gluck, supra note 18, at 1651–52.
25. See id.
26. For example, committee reports are the product of chamber rules, which are
themselves sanctioned by Article I. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5, cl. 2; Rules of the House of
Representatives, 117th Cong., R. XIII, at 26 (2021); STANDING RULES OF THE SENATE, S. DOC.
NO. 113-18, at 12, 31 (2013). On the idea of “nested intentions” and its relationship to
institutional intent, see EKINS, supra note 9, at 10.
27. For an argument that attribution of group intentions need not even rely on this level
of formality in the nesting of intentions, see EKINS, supra note 9, at 61 (arguing that
“procedures are not fundamental to the structure of group action”).
28. This binary typically is simply assumed in the scholarship. For a scholar who
explicitly defends it, see Doerfler, supra note 10, at 999–1000. For a response to Doerfler’s
argument, see infra Part III.A.
29. This Article uses “disaggregated-intent theory of legislation” and
“disaggregated-intent theory” interchangeably.
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As this Article explains, disaggregated-intent theory is theoretically viable,
constitutionally defensible, and in accord even with skeptical notions of
legislative authority. On the theoretical front, disaggregated-intent theory
has been overlooked only because two separate ideas about legislative
intent—consolidation and transfer—have been conflated in discussions of
intent skepticism. Once these ideas are disentangled, it becomes clear that
intent skepticism leaves ample room for the continued relevance of
legislative intent, as conceived under disaggregated-intent theory.
On the constitutional front, this Article argues that disaggregated-intent
theory is sanctioned by the U.S. Constitution, both in superficial text and
deeper structure. Textually, some have argued that the Constitution requires
interpreters to view Congress exclusively in unitary, institutional terms.30
Challenging this view, this Article explains that constitutional text in fact
sanctions a plural, disaggregated view of Congress. Structurally, meanwhile,
the argument for disaggregated-intent theory is even stronger. The
Constitution equates the successful transfer of a certain type of disaggregated
intention with advancement of the constitutional value of democratic
self-government.31 By retaining a space for discussion of this legislator
intention in statutory interpretation, disaggregated-intent theory both makes
sense of constitutional structure and provides the opportunity to strategically
advance values inherent in it. In this regard, it is textualism that encounters
constitutional problems—at least, insofar as textualism is understood to
entail a rejection of legislation as a vehicle for transfers of intent.32
On the authority front, disaggregated-intent theory proves to be
surprisingly compatible even with intent-skeptical notions of legislative
authority. To illustrate this point, this Article examines Professor Jeremy
Waldron’s oft-cited theory of legislation and legislative authority.33 While
Professor Waldron argues that his notions of legislative authority entail a
wholesale pivot away from intention in statutory interpretation, his theories
of authority potentially point toward the need to preserve the same type of
legislator intention that constitutional structure also deems significant.
Having argued for the theoretical, constitutional, and authority-based
legitimacy of disaggregated-intent theory, this Article then contends that this
theory, once accepted as legitimate, can revise our understanding of specific
methods of statutory interpretation. To illustrate this, this Article turns to the
interpretive method of intentionalism—showing how a different
understanding of this methodology emerges from an approach rooted in
disaggregated-intent theory. Here, this Article attempts to illustrate that,
30. See Doerfler, supra note 10, at 999–1000.
31. See infra Part III.B.
32. For a rare example of textualism that does not reject the search for intent, see Caleb
Nelson, What Is Textualism?, 91 VA. L. REV. 347, 372 (2005) (suggesting that “textualists
are as interested as intentionalists in enforcing the intended meaning of statutory language, and
simply believe that the textualist approach will better capture the type of intent that both camps
seek”).
33. For a detailed explanation of Professor Jeremy Waldron’s theory of legislation and
legislative authority, see infra Part IV.
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once we reconceptualize intentionalism to fit the premises of
disaggregated-intent theory, we gain a number of new insights into the
methodology’s strengths and weaknesses.
These insights emerge primarily because, as already mentioned,
disaggregated-intent theory allows us to understand statutory interpretation
as a method to advance the constitutional value of democratic
self-government. Intentionalism proposes to do this by instructing
interpreters to identify and give effect to their best guess of legislator
understandings of statutes (i.e., the understandings that provide the
foundation for legislator intentions). Understanding intentionalism in this
way provides clarity with respect to a number of ambiguities that have
plagued intentionalism, including questions about (1) how many legislators
must share an intention, (2) which type of legislator intentions are relevant,
and (3) how far one must go in promoting those intentions. Along the way,
this reframing of intentionalism also addresses other traditional critiques of
the methodology—including those related to Arrovian cycling,34 to
intentionalism’s supposed denigration of the legislative process,35 and to
intentionalism’s devaluation of the notice-giving function of statutes.36
At the same time, this reconceptualization of intentionalism also raises
new questions about the methodology. For example, it draws attention to
intentionalism’s tendency to treat legislators as having not only equal votes
but also equal voices37—a tendency that arguably preserves, and perhaps
even needlessly magnifies, the apportionment distortions that impede the
maximization of democratic self-government.38
Congress’s capacity to act as a single, unitary institution may be debatable.
Even if we accept the idea of Congress as a “they,” however, it does not
eliminate the role of intent in statutory interpretation. To the contrary, it
unlocks new ways of thinking about intent and interpretive method—ways
that can help resolve longstanding stalemates in the field of legislation, as
well as create new conversations about the role of courts in statutory
interpretation.
This Article proceeds in five parts. Part I provides a brief background on
the critique of corporate legislative intent. Part II explains that, even if we
accept this critique, the disaggregated-intent theory of legislation remains
theoretically viable. Part III argues that disaggregated-intent theory also is
constitutionally permissible—and, in fact, accords with fundamental
constitutional principles in ways that textualism does not. Part IV contends
that disaggregated-intent theory also accords with Professor Waldron’s
skeptical notions of legislative authority. Part V examines what it means to
think of intentionalism under disaggregated-intent theory—and it shows
34. See infra notes 216–22 and accompanying text.
35. See infra notes 212–22 and accompanying text.
36. See infra notes 259–68 and accompanying text.
37. Professor Richard Ekins refers to this quality as the “formal equality of legislators.”
EKINS, supra note 9, at 23.
38. For a summary of these apportionment distortions, see infra notes 203–06 and
accompanying text.
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how, once reconceived in these terms, several criticisms of intentionalism are
resolved. Part V also considers possible counterarguments, and it highlights
previously unexamined weaknesses of intentionalism that become evident
under disaggregated-intent theory. A brief conclusion follows.
I. BACKGROUND: CONGRESS AS AN “IT”
A longstanding critique of intentionalism has posited that a legislature
generally, or Congress in particular, is incapable of forming a collective
institutional intent. When intentionalist courts look to identify legislative
intent, these critics claim, they therefore look for something nonexistent.
This part briefly reviews the history of this critique in American law.
Since the Founding, as even textualists have noted, it has been common
for American courts to characterize Congress (and any other legislature) as a
body that possesses an institutional “intent” and to describe statutory
interpretation as a search for that intent.39 Chief Justice John Marshall, for
example, remarked that “the duty of the court [is] to effect the intention of
the legislature,”40 and he described the goal of interpretation as “discovering
the mind of the legislature.”41 While competing, nonintentionalist
approaches to statutory interpretation can be found in early American law,
with judicial opinions buttressing ideas about courts acting as lawmaking
partners42 or hewing to more textualist ideas,43 it was widely accepted in
early American legal history that legislative intent was an appropriate object
to pursue in statutory interpretation.44
This would begin to change with the legal realist movement of the 1930s.45
In the effort to underscore the policymaking role that judges perform in
statutory interpretation, Professor Max Radin offered a formative critique of
the idea of legislative intent in a 1930 article, remarking:
A legislature certainly has no intention whatever in connection with words
which some two or three men drafted, which a considerable number

39. See, e.g., John F. Manning, Textualism and the Equity of the Statute, 101 COLUM. L.
REV. 1, 91 (2001) (explaining that “[t]he Marshall Court frequently emphasized that the
federal judge’s constitutional duty was to adhere to the legislature’s intent”).
40. Schooner Paulina’s Cargo v. United States, 11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 52, 60 (1812) (“[I]t
has been truly stated to be the duty of the court to effect the intention of the legislature . . . .”).
41. Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33, 52 (1804). But see William N. Eskridge,
Jr., All About Words: Early Understandings of the “Judicial Power” in Statutory
Interpretation, 1776–1806, 101 COLUM. L. REV. 990, 997 (2001) (“[Marshall’s] opinions run
the gamut of methodologies but do consistently take a complex approach to text, as imbued
with history, principles, and political choices.”).
42. See generally Eskridge, supra note 41 (documenting pragmatic or partnership models
in early American jurisprudence).
43. See Manning, supra note 39, at 87–90 (documenting textualist models in early
jurisprudence).
44. As one casebook puts it, “Since the beginning of our republic, courts have invoked
the concept of legislative ‘intent’ to signal that legislators, not courts, create legislative
meaning.” ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 302.
45. On the dating of the realist movement, see NEIL DUXBURY, PATTERNS OF AMERICAN
JURISPRUDENCE 72–79 (1995).
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rejected, and in regard to which many of the approving majority might have
had, and often demonstrably did have, different ideas and beliefs.
That the intention of the legislature is undiscoverable in any real sense
is almost an immediate inference from a statement of the proposition. The
chances that of several hundred [legislators] each will have exactly the
same determinate situations in mind as possible reductions of a given
determinable, are infinitesimally small.46

Realist critiques notwithstanding, however, the Supreme Court continued to
approach statutory interpretation as a search for legislative intent throughout
the New Deal47 and post–New Deal eras.48 During these years, the Court
increasingly looked to legislative history that Congress was generating, both
on the chamber floor and through its committee system,49 for evidence of this
institutional intent.50
Beginning in the 1980s, this use of legislative history would undergo more
sustained critique51—and so would the concept of legislative intent itself.52
Drawing upon Professor Radin’s earlier analysis,53 a new movement of
textualists increasingly viewed the concept as incoherent.54 For instance,
Justice Antonin Scalia argued that the search for legislative intent is a
“wild-goose chase,”55 while Judge Frank H. Easterbrook contended that
intent is “fictive for a collective body”56 and that “the concept of ‘an’
intent . . . for an institution [is] hilarious.”57 Explaining the logic of this
objection, Judge Easterbrook remarked that: “Because legislatures comprise
46. Max Radin, Statutory Interpretation, 43 HARV. L. REV. 863, 870 (1930). For a
discussion of a German antecedent to Professor Max Radin’s argument, see EKINS, supra note
9, at 4–5 (discussing Gustav Radbruch’s 1910 critique).
47. See Charles Tiefer, The Reconceptualization of Legislative History in the Supreme
Court, 2000 WIS. L. REV. 205, 274 n.366 (describing the approach of “New Deal
intentionalism”).
48. See, e.g., Caleb Nelson, A Response to Professor Manning, 91 VA. L. REV. 451, 456
(2005) (noting that “[f]rom the 1950s until the 1970s . . . the interpretive conventions
associated with [intentionalism and purposivism] dominated American jurisprudence”).
49. On the hierarchy of legislative history sources that emerged from the Court during this
period, see ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 631 (reporting the “conventional hierarchy” of
legislative history).
50. See Tiefer, supra note 47, at 212–13 (“It was not until the New Deal Court . . . that
the modern era of fuller, more accurate use of legislative history began.”).
51. See Solan, supra note 15, at 427 (“Perhaps the greatest controversy over statutory
interpretation during the past two decades concerns the use of legislative history as evidence
of the intent of the legislature.”).
52. See id. (“More basically, the concept of legislative intent has itself been subject to
attack.”).
53. See William N. Eskridge, Jr., Legislative History Values, 66 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 365,
372–73 (1990) (discussing textualists’ debt to Radin); Manning, supra note 3, at 684–85
(connecting new textualist critiques to Radin’s realist analysis); Manning, supra note 7, at
2410 n.81 (noting that “textualists’ intent skepticism can be traced to the work of Max Radin”).
54. On this movement generally, see Eskridge, supra note 3.
55. Scalia, supra note 11, at 517; see also Scalia, supra note 3, at 29–32.
56. Frank H. Easterbrook, Text, History, and Structure in Statutory Interpretation, 17
HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 61, 68 (1994).
57. Frank H. Easterbrook, Some Tasks in Understanding Law Through the Lens of Public
Choice, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 284, 284–85 (1992).
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many members, they do not have ‘intents’ or ‘designs,’ hidden yet
discoverable.”58 In addition to building upon earlier realist critiques, these
textualists drew upon more recent ideas in public choice theory,59 a field that
raised new questions about the ability of legislatures to possess stable, shared
policy preferences.60 Governmental actors such as the U.S. Department of
Justice Office of Legal Policy,61 as well as prominent textualist scholars such
as Professor Manning,62 both observed this growing criticism and further
advanced it.63 For these textualists, skepticism about the existence of a
collective legislative intent typically was viewed as an indictment of
intentionalist methodology, and therefore as an argument in favor of
textualism as a competing method.64 Meanwhile, other legal scholars
increasingly joined this skepticism about corporate legislative intent, even
when not endorsing textualist methodologies,65 as did several prominent
legal philosophers.66 It was a skepticism that Professor Shepsle distilled into

58. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 547; see also Frank H. Easterbrook, The Role of Original
Intent in Statutory Construction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 59, 64 n.10 (1988) [hereinafter
Easterbrook, Original Intent].
59. Describing public choice theory during its ascendancy, Professors Daniel A. Farber
and Philip P. Frickey characterized it as “a highly influential group of economists and political
scientists” who “apply economic methodology to the study of political institutions.” Daniel
A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74 VA. L. REV. 423, 424
(1988).
60. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 547–48 (explaining that intent skepticism
“follows from the discoveries of public choice theory”). For a response to this use of public
choice theory, see infra Parts V.A.2, V.B.2.
61. OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., USING AND MISUSING LEGISLATIVE
HISTORY: A RE-EVALUATION OF THE STATUS OF LEGISLATIVE HISTORY IN STATUTORY
INTERPRETATION ii (1989) (“[T]he problem of discerning the intended meaning of a collective
body is essentially insoluble. . . . No one has yet proposed a satisfactory method of
determining the group intent of a body when the individual members of that body may have
differing intents.”).
62. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 7, at 2410 n.81 (reiterating this critique and connecting
it to Radin’s arguments); Manning, supra note 3, at 675 (noting and aligning with “textualist
judges [who] argue that a 535-member legislature has no ‘genuine’ collective intent with
respect to matters left ambiguous by the statute itself”).
63. See also JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT 99 (1999). For an overview of
international courts and scholars making similar arguments, see EKINS, supra note 9, at 3–4.
64. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 56, at 67 (“The more of these propositions you
accept [including that intent is an empty concept], the more likely you are to accept my
conclusion that statutory text and structure, as opposed to legislative history and intent (actual
or imputed), supply the proper foundation for meaning.”).
65. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 326 (1990) (“It is hard enough to work out a
theory for ascertaining the ‘intent’ of individuals in tort and criminal law. To talk about the
‘intent’ of the legislature . . . multiplies these difficulties, because we must ascribe an intention
not only to individuals, but to a sizeable group of individuals . . . .”); see also RONALD
DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 318–50 (1986).
66. See, e.g., Joseph Raz, Intention in Interpretation, in THE AUTONOMY OF LAW: ESSAYS
ON LEGAL POSITIVISM 249, 258–59 (Robert P. George ed., 1996); DWORKIN, supra note 65, at
324; WALDRON, supra note 63, at 119–122; see also EKINS, supra note 9, at 10 (agreeing that
Professors Dworkin and Waldron “succeed . . . in discrediting aggregative conceptions of
legislative intent” while developing a theory of institutional intent).
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a phrase that would become shorthand for this critique,67 writing in a 1992
article that “Congress is a ‘they,’ not an ‘it.’”68
In response to this textualist-driven critique, scholars advanced new
arguments in defense of the idea of legislative intent, arguing that it was a
coherent concept that courts deployed in a manner consistent with everyday
linguistic practice.69 Professor Lawrence Solan, for example, argued that
advances in the humanities and social sciences revealed “that it makes
perfectly good sense to speak of legislative intent,” observing that we
“routinely attribute intent to a group of people” in an institution with the
features of a legislature.70 Justice Breyer advanced similar arguments.71
More recently, pressure has been put on the textualist-driven critique,
albeit indirectly, by a wave of legislation scholarship that has emerged in the
last decade. During this period, the field of legislation has experienced what
Justice Barrett has termed a “process-based turn in statutory interpretation.”72
This process-based turn, largely inaugurated by a formative study by
Professors Abbe R. Gluck and Lisa Schultz Bressman in 2013,73 has
generated a large and growing body of scholarship examining the
institutional realities of the modern Congress and their implications for
statutory interpretation doctrine.74 This scholarship typically has not
undertaken theoretical defenses of institutional legislative intent nor has it
tended to engage in explicit debate over intent skepticism.75 Nonetheless, in
its assumption that legislative realities can and should bear upon statutory
interpretation,76 some have perceived an implied return to a brand of
intentionalism that relies upon the idea of institutional legislative intent.77

67. As Professor Ryan A. Doerfler notes, this phrase has become “a common refrain” in
legislation scholarship. Doerfler, supra note 10, at 982. For prominent examples of its use,
see supra note 9 and accompanying text.
68. Shepsle, supra note 10, at 244.
69. See, e.g., Solan, supra note 15, at 428; see also EKINS, supra note 9, at 1–14.
70. Solan, supra note 15, at 428; see also EKINS, supra note 9, at 1–14 (outlining a theory
of legislation as action on joint intentions formed by legislature).
71. See generally STEPHEN BREYER, MAKING OUR DEMOCRACY WORK: A JUDGE’S VIEW
(2010); Breyer, supra note 14, at 865 (explaining that “those who understand the group do not
ordinarily have trouble properly ascribing purposes to its activities, at least in ordinary cases”);
see also generally CHRISTIAN LIST & PHILIP PETTIT, GROUP AGENCY: THE POSSIBILITY,
DESIGN, AND STATUS OF CORPORATE AGENTS (2011).
72. Amy Coney Barrett, Congressional Insiders and Outsiders, 84 U. CHI. L. REV. 2193,
2194 (2017). For her part, Justice Barrett is skeptical of the interpretive utility of this
process-based turn. See id. at 2200–01, 2205.
73. See generally Gluck & Bressman, Statutory Interpretation I, supra note 19; Bressman
& Gluck, supra note 10.
74. See supra notes 18–19 and accompanying text (listing works from this scholarly
movement).
75. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 12, at 1935 (noting that “Professors Gluck and
Bressman do not identify themselves with classic intentionalism”).
76. See supra note 21 (noting proposed doctrinal takeaways from this scholarship).
77. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 12, at 1935 (noting that, by invoking “the subjective
expectations of legislative drafters,” Gluck and Bressman “plainly invoke intentionalist
reasoning”).
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In response to this process-based turn, several prominent scholars have
revived arguments about the impossibility of Congress forming a single,
collective intent.78 Professor Manning, for example, has reiterated prior
objections to the idea of congressional intent,79 and he has argued that
findings in the Gluck/Bressman study actually buttress concerns about the
ability to locate a single institutional intent.80 In addition, Professor Ryan A.
Doerfler has argued that Congress lacks the delegatory structure required to
meet the definition of shared agency used in scholarship on the philosophy
of action, and that congressional intent therefore is a fiction.81 In each
instance, skepticism about collective legislative intent has been presented as
a rebuke to the process-based turn in legislation, a movement assumed by
these critics to rest upon the theory of collective intent for the persuasiveness
of its interpretive takeaways.82
II. THE THEORETICAL VIABILITY OF DISAGGREGATED INTENT
Recent intent skeptics therefore have suggested that the critique of
institutional legislative intent, if persuasive, directs statutory interpreters to
discard the concept of intent in statutory interpretation. Yet even if we accept
the premises of intent skepticism, the idea of legislative intent remains
theoretically viable.
To understand the continued viability of intent, it is necessary to
disentangle two actions that may be performed with legislative intent:
consolidation and transfer. On the one hand, a legislature theoretically might
consolidate legislative intent when drafting and approving legislation,
thereby combining the myriad intentions of legislators into a single
institutional intent. On the other hand, a legislature also might transfer
legislative intent (or create the conditions for such a transfer), producing a
text that could potentially advance legislative intentions when interpreted and
applied.
Intent skeptics and their respondents have focused on a specific brand of
intentionalism: one that views the enactment process, with respect to intent,

78. For the notable exception of a response that did not raise this critique, see Barrett,
supra note 72, at 2200.
79. See Manning, supra note 12, at 1916 (“No one can identify ‘congressional intent’ or
the ‘legislative deal’ as a matter of fact . . . .”).
80. See id. at 1936–37 (“[The Gluck/Bressman study’s] findings . . . confirm rather than
undercut (a) the ineffability and contingency of legislative intent and (b) the corresponding
impossibility of treating intent as a ‘fact of the matter’ that can be made sense of without a
normative frame of reference.”).
81. See Doerfler, supra note 10, at 979–80.
82. See Manning, supra note 12, at 1916 (“This Essay argues that the new empiricism
does not undermine the intent skepticism that has framed so much of the discussion about how
to read statutes.”); Doerfler, supra note 10, at 985–86 (“This Article argues that none of these
approaches [of the process-based turn] makes sense when the context consists of information
salient to all, not only to drafters. ‘[I]gnorance of how Congress works’ is lamentable for
various reasons, but the nuances of the legislative process are largely irrelevant for the purpose
of interpretation.” (second alteration in original) (quoting Nourse, supra note 19, at 85)).
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as both a consolidation and a transfer.83 Under this version of intentionalism,
legislators are assumed to (1) combine to form a single institutional intent
and (2) draft a statute that is designed (and has the capacity) to carry forward
that single intent. This brand of intentionalism, with its emphasis on both
consolidation and transfer, might be described as the aggregated-intent
theory of legislation.
To critique aggregated-intent theory, intent skeptics have focused
specifically on one prong of this theory: consolidation.84 Yet a critique of
consolidation, by itself, does not necessarily push interpreters to move away
from intent altogether and to speak instead in the register of textualism and
its associated constitutional values (such as notice85 and congressional
incentivization86). Rather, it still might be possible to conceive of legislation
as performing a transfer, but not a consolidation, of intent. Under this view,
the legislature may never have formed a corporate, institutional intent with
respect to a given statutory provision. Nonetheless, individual members of
Congress still may have formed individual intentions they believed were
encoded in the provision. Consequently, each statutory provision has the
capacity to carry forward a set of legislator intentions—intentions that will
be either advanced or frustrated by the statute’s interpretation. Because those
intentions never coalesce into an intent of the legislature, however, an
interpretation’s advancement of intent now becomes a fractional affair—
realizing the intentions of some particular legislators, while frustrating
others. This might be labeled the disaggregated-intent theory of legislation.
For intent skeptics to defend a pivot to textualism, they also must explain
why the disaggregated-intent theory is untenable.87 Otherwise, legislator
intentions might remain relevant to statutory interpretation, intent skepticism
notwithstanding.88 This raises the question: what is the problem with the
disaggregated-intent theory of legislation?
83. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 39, at 55; see also Eskridge, supra note 4, at 1479–80
(describing intentionalism as search for the “intent of the legislature”); Easterbrook, supra
note 57, at 284 (describing intentionalism as the search for “intent . . . [of] an institution”).
84. See supra Part I (discussing the various components of aggregated-intent theory).
85. See, e.g., Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (“The people are
entitled to rely on the law as written, without fearing that courts might disregard its plain terms
based on some extratextual consideration.”); Barrett, supra note 72, at 2195 (arguing that
textualists “view themselves as agents of the people rather than of Congress”).
86. See, e.g., Finley v. United States, 490 U.S. 545, 556 (1989) (“[It] is of paramount
importance . . . that Congress be able to legislate against a background of clear interpretive
rules, so that it may know the effect of the language it adopts.”); Easterbrook, supra note 3, at
539–40 (arguing for unambiguous interpretive rules to provide a clear backdrop for drafting
legislation); Manning, supra note 12, at 1913–14 (noting that the interpretive method should
facilitate legislative compromise).
87. Professor Doerfler recently attempted to offer such a defense. See Doerfler, supra note
10, at 999. For a response, see infra Part III.
88. As Professor Andrei Marmor puts it, “the skeptic is opposed to the ontological
perplexities raised by the potential reference” to “the idea of a group-intention,” but this idea
can be distinguished from the notion of “shared intentions,” the latter of which “involves no
such ontological perplexities. Even if you are a skeptic about the idea of group intentions, you
cannot deny that it is possible for many people to have basically the same kind of intentions
(or at least very similar ones).” ANDREI MARMOR, INTERPRETATION AND LEGAL THEORY 124
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III. THE CONSTITUTION AND DISAGGREGATED INTENT
Perhaps the answer lies in the Constitution. The disaggregated-intent
theory of legislation might be theoretically viable, yet constitutionally
problematic. As this part explains, however, that is not the case. The
Constitution actually sanctions disaggregated-intent theory, as a matter of
both superficial text and deeper principle. In fact, it is the intent skeptics who
run into constitutional difficulty.
A. Constitutional Text
First, consider the plain text of the Constitution. Professor Doerfler has
argued that constitutional text prohibits any turn to disaggregated-intent
theory, saying:
As far as the Constitution is concerned, Congress is an “it,” not a
“they.” Article I, Section 1 vests all granted legislative powers in “a
Congress.” The Constitution also specifies various things that “the
Congress” may or shall do. In each instance, the Constitution refers to
Congress as a single body as opposed to a collection of individuals.89

To the extent that weight is placed on this type of grammatical detail in
Article I, however, much evidence also cuts in the opposite direction. If the
founders were adamant about others (including courts) viewing Congress as
a unitary institution, one would expect to find the Constitution referring to
Congress exclusively in the unitary, institutional terms that Doerfler
highlights.90 Yet this is not how the Constitution always (or even typically)
speaks of Congress. Quite literally, the Constitution labels Congress as a
“they”; it refers to Congress via pronoun six times, and each time it uses the
plural pronouns “they”91 and “their.”92 For example, the Constitution states,
“The Congress shall . . . [meet] on the first Monday in December, unless they
shall by Law appoint a different Day.”93 References to the individual
chambers are more mixed, but these similarly tend toward the plural; seven
(2d ed. 2005). For others noting this distinct concept of intentions without consolidation, see
MARGARET GILBERT, ON SOCIAL FACTS 19 (1989) (referring to this as the idea of “summative”
intentions); EKINS, supra note 9, at 47 (describing a version of intent that functions as “mere
shorthand to enable us to refer to the intentions of many individuals at once”).
89. Doerfler, supra note 10, at 999. For an argument outside the statutory interpretation
context highlighting the constitutional necessity of viewing Congress as a unitary institution,
see Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the Collective
Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1491–1501 (2015).
90. See Doerfler, supra note 10, at 999–1000.
91. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (“The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years
after the first Meeting of the Congress [and thereafter] in such Manner as they shall by Law
direct.”); id. art. II, § 2 (“[T]he Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior
Officers, as they think proper . . . .”); id. amend. XX, § 2 (“The Congress shall assemble at
least once in every year, and such meeting shall begin at noon on the 3d day of January, unless
they shall by law appoint a different day.”); see also infra note 93 and accompanying text.
92. See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3 (“[The President] shall from time to time give to the
Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend [measures] to their
Consideration . . . .”); see also infra note 96 and accompanying text.
93. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4, cl. 2 (emphasis added).
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single-chamber references are plural,94 while only three are singular.95 This
usage appears even in the crucial bicameralism-and-presentment provision,
with respect to both Congress96 and each chamber.97 This is not the language
one employs to describe an institution that must be conceptualized in
corporate, institutional terms. Instead, the term “Congress” repeatedly
functions as a shorthand to refer to its various, disaggregated members.
Constitutional text therefore offers a flipside to Professor Shepsle’s famous
observation: Congress may indeed be a “they,” and constitutional text
permits us to consider it as such.98
B. Constitutional Design
There also are deeper structural reasons to believe that the Constitution
sanctions disaggregated-intent theory. That theory retains a space in
statutory interpretation for recognition of a certain type of individual
legislator intention. The Constitution equates the successful transfer of such
legislator intention with advancement of a key constitutional value:
democratic self-government.99 By retaining a space for analysis of this
94. See id. art. I, § 2 (“The House of Representatives shall chuse their Speaker and other
Officers . . . .”); id. art. I, § 3 (“The Senate shall chuse their other Officers . . . .”); id. (“The
Vice President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote,
unless they be equally divided.”); id. (“The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all
Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation.”); id. art.
I, § 5 (“Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the
same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy . . . .”); id. art. II, § 2
(“The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess
of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.”);
see also infra note 97 and accompanying text.
95. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5 (“Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and
Qualifications of its own Members . . . .”); id. (“Each House may determine the Rules of its
Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour . . . .”); id. (“Each House shall keep
a Journal of its Proceedings . . . .”).
96. Id. art. I, § 7 (stating that the failure by the President to return a bill within ten days
makes it law “unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent[s] its Return”).
97. Id. (“[T]hat House in which [a vetoed bill] shall have originated, . . . shall enter the
[President’s] Objections at large on their Journal . . . .”).
98. See Shepsle, supra note 10, at 244. Applied to intent, this seemingly permits
interpreters to consider what Professor Margaret Gilbert calls “summative accounts” of
congressional intention. See GILBERT, supra note 88, at 19. As Professor Ekins puts it,
congressional intent “is understood as a shorthand reference to what is common amongst
members of the group,” rather than as a reference to a distinct, unitary institutional intent.
EKINS, supra note 9, at 50.
99. See Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 370 (1886) (“[I]n our system, while sovereign
powers are delegated to the agencies of government, sovereignty itself remains with the
people, by whom and for whom all government exists and acts.”); Chisholm v. Georgia, 2
U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 472 (1793) (“Soverignty [sic] is the right to govern . . . here it rests with
the people . . . .”); id. at 471 (noting that “the sovereignty of the nation is in the people of the
nation”); see also John Adams, Autobiography, in 3 CHARLES FRANCIS ADAMS, THE WORKS
OF JOHN ADAMS, SECOND PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES 3, 16 (Boston, Little, Brown &
Co. 1865) (claiming that under the Constitution “the people were the source of all authority
and original of all power”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, at 251 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke
ed., Wesleyan University Press 1961) (describing the federal government as “a government
which derives all its powers directly or indirectly from the great body of the people”); James
Wilson, Speech to the Philadelphia Convention (Dec. 4, 1787), in 2 JONATHAN ELLIOT, THE
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legislator intention in statutory interpretation, disaggregated-intent theory
therefore both makes sense of constitutional structure and provides the
opportunity to strategically advance values inherent in it.
1. Design Explained
The value that our constitutional scheme places on democratic
self-government is apparent.100 In the words of Federalist 39, the
Constitution was understood as a project to “rest all our political experiments
on the capacity of mankind for self-government.”101 By committing to the
idea of “self-government,” the Founding generation generally aspired to
“make the voice of a majority of the people the law of the land,” as the
Pennsylvania state constitution described it.102 In order to accomplish this
goal, the Constitution aimed to create a system in which the political desires
of the community would circle around, in some meaningful fashion, in the
form of rules that govern the same community.103 By creating this circuit of
democratic will, the Constitution would attempt to create a system in which,
as Chief Justice John Jay would reflect in Chisholm v. Georgia,104 the people
of the United States would work “as joint tenants in the sovereignty,” and
with “none to govern but themselves.”105
The Constitution was designed to promote this vision of self-government
on two tracks.106 First, it would promote it on the constitutional level, where
DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF THE FEDERAL
CONSTITUTION 453, 456 (J.B. Lippincott Co. 1891) (describing the public as “the fountain of
government”).
100. See, e.g., AKHIL REED AMAR, AMERICA’S CONSTITUTION: A BIOGRAPHY 13 (2006)
(describing it as “the Constitution’s bedrock idea”); Akhil Reed Amar, The Central Meaning
of Republican Government: Popular Sovereignty, Majority Rule, and the Denominator
Problem, 65 U. COLO. L. REV. 749, 749 (1994) (“The central pillar of Republican Government,
I claim, is popular sovereignty. In a Republican Government, the people rule.”); Daniel M.
Braun, Constitutional Fracticality: Structure and Coherence in the Nation’s Supreme Law,
32 ST. LOUIS U. PUB. L. REV. 389, 395 (2013) (“The Preamble’s foundational principle of
popular sovereignty reverberates throughout (virtually) the entire Constitution.”); Andrew G.
I. Kilberg, Note, We the People: The Original Meaning of Popular Sovereignty, 100 VA. L.
REV. 1061, 1102 (2014) (“[T]he Constitution is premised on popular sovereignty . . . .”); Kurt
T. Lash, The Cost of Judicial Error: Stare Decisis and the Role of Normative Theory, 89
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 2189, 2206 (2014) (“The theory of popular sovereignty is foundational
to the system of American constitutional law.”).
101. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39, supra note 99, at 250 (James Madison).
102. PA. CONST. § 17 (1776), https://avalon.law.yale.edu/18th_century/pa08.asp
[https://perma.cc/6EFE-DE8M]; see also 2 THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF
1787, at 451 (Max Farrand ed., 1911) (Aug. 29, 1787) [hereinafter FARRAND’S RECORDS]
(statement of George Mason, as rendered by James Madison) (“The majority will be governed
by their interests.”).
103. As George Mason put it, it was a system whereby “[t]he Majority will be governed by
their interests.” See 2 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 102, at 451 (Aug. 29, 1787) (statement
of George Mason, as rendered by Madison).
104. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
105. Id. at 472.
106. On the American system as a “dualist” or two-track system requiring different levels
and types of public assent for different types of legal change, see 1 BRUCE A. ACKERMAN, WE
THE PEOPLE: FOUNDATIONS 3–34 (1991).
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ratification107 and amendment108 rules would provide the public with a voice
in shaping the nation’s higher law.109 Second, the Constitution also
committed the nation to democratic self-government with respect to ordinary
federal legislation.110 To this latter end, the Constitution created a
governmental architecture designed to allow democratic will to flow outward
from the public, through and across a variety of governmental actors and
institutions, and back to the public as enforceable laws. Specifically, the
Constitution outlined four key transfer points, where political desires would
pass from one constitutional actor to another:
Transfer One: Public  Members of Congress (primarily via elections)111
Transfer Two: Members of Congress  Legal texts (via enactment of
laws)112
Transfer Three: Legal texts  Executive and judicial branches (via
interpretation of laws)113
Transfer Four: Executive and judicial branches  Public (via enforcement
of laws)114

Many constitutional provisions were designed to ensure that these transfers
were successful. Consider the first transfer. Here, a key constitutional
objective was to transmit the political goals of the public into the legislature.
In so doing, it ideally would make the impulses of Congress mirror and
mimic those in the larger public.115 As John Adams put it, a legislature
107. U.S. CONST. art. VII.
108. Id. art. V.
109. This was the role for “the People” signaled in the Preamble and perhaps for
“Conventions” of the people in Article V. Id. pmbl; id. art. V; see also ACKERMAN, supra note
106, at 168–75 (discussing the Founding-era understanding of the Convention).
110. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7. This was the role established for “the People” in Article I
and for “the people” via the Seventeenth Amendment. Id. art. I, § 2; id. amend. XVII; see also
AMAR, supra note 100, at 64 (discussing text of Article I, Section 2).
111. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–6.
112. Id. art. I, §§ 7–8.
113. Id. art. I, § 1; id. art. II, § 1.
114. Id. art. I, §§ 1, 8; id. art. VI.
115. See Essays of Brutus III, in 2 THE COMPLETE ANTI-FEDERALIST 358, 379–80 (Herbert
J. Storing ed., 1980) (“The very term, representative, implies, that the person or body chosen
for this purpose, should resemble those who appoint them—a representation of the people of
America, if it be a true one, must be like the people. It ought to be so constituted, that a person,
who is a stranger to the country, might be able to form a just idea of their character, by knowing
that of their representatives. They are the sign—the people are the thing signified. It is absurd
to speak of one thing being the representative of another, upon any other principle. The ground
and reason of representation, in a free government, implies the same thing. . . . [T]hose who
are placed instead of the people, should possess their sentiments and feelings, and be governed
by their interests, or, in other words, should bear the strongest resemblance of those in whose
room they are substituted.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 99, at 355 (James
Madison) (advocating for a “scheme of representation [that could function] as a substitute for
a meeting of the citizens in person”); 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 102, at 132–33 (June
6, 1787) (statement of James Wilson, rendered by Madison) (remarking that representation
was “necessary only because it is impossible for the people to act collectively”); id. at 561
(July 9, 1787) (statement of William Patterson, rendered by Madison) (“What is the true
principle of Representation? It is an expedient by which an assembly of certain individls [sic]
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“should be in miniature an exact portrait of the people at large. It should
think, feel, reason, and act like them.”116
A host of constitutional provisions therefore were designed to pressure
each member of Congress to act in accordance with the political desires of
his or her constituents, thereby effectively transferring constituent desires
into legislators.117 As Federalist 57 put it, “Duty, gratitude, interest,
ambition itself, are the chords by which [representatives] will be bound to
fidelity and sympathy with the great mass of the people.”118 This was the
flip side of the Constitution’s physics-like calculations regarding personal
ambition,119 which trafficked in attraction as well as repulsion.120
Institutional design, it was hoped, would translate legislator ambition not
only into salutary oppositions (i.e., checks and balances) but also into useful
alignments—here, between voters and members of Congress.121 This goal
shaped provisions on the regularity of elections,122 term lengths,123 chamber
chosen by the people is substituted in place of the inconvenient meeting of the people
themselves.”).
116. John Adams, Thoughts on Government, in AMERICAN POLITICAL WRITING DURING
THE FOUNDING ERA, 1760–1805, at 401, 403 (Charles S. Hyneman & Donald S. Lutz eds.,
1983); see also 1 FARRAND’S RECORDS, supra note 102, at 132 (June 6, 1787) (statement of
James Wilson, rendered by Madison) (describing that a goal of Congress is to be “the most
exact transcript of the whole Society”).
117. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 99, at 386 (James Madison) (describing the
“ties which bind the representative to his constituents”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note
99, at 357, 359 (James Madison) (describing the Constitution as creating for public “a due
connection between their representatives and themselves” and a “Federal Legislature [that]
will . . . be restrained by its dependence on the people”).
118. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 99, at 387 (James Madison).
119. For a recent example discussing the constitutional understanding of ambition in terms
of Founding-era physics, see Jonathan Turley, Madisonian Tectonics: How Form Follows
Function in Constitutional and Architectural Interpretation, 83 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 305, 314
(2015).
120. For an overview of debates regarding the role of mechanistic and physics metaphors
in constitutional construction, see generally Jesse M. Cross, National “Harmony”: An
Inter-Branch Constitutional Principle and Its Application to Diversity Jurisdiction, 93 NEB.
L. REV. 139, 174–77 (2014); Note, Organic and Mechanical Metaphors in Late EighteenthCentury American Political Thought, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1832 (1997).
121. At the Founding, this public-to-legislator transition too regularly was understood as
both consolidation and transfer. See, e.g., THE FEDERALIST NO. 10, supra note 99, at 57 (James
Madison) (“By a faction, I understand a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority
or a minority of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion,
or of interest, adverse to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests
of the community.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 99, at 351 (James Madison)
(“Different interests necessarily exist in different classes of citizens. If a majority be united
by a common interest, the rights of the minority will be insecure.”). As such, contemporary
theory seems to have less trouble regarding this today in disaggregated terms.
122. U.S. CONST., art. I, §§ 2–3; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 99, at 355
(James Madison) (explaining that election provisions were expected to create “a common
interest with the people” and secure “an immediate dependence on, [and] an intimate
sympathy with the people”).
123. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 52, supra note 99, at 356
(James Madison) (“[W]e cannot doubt that a reduction of the period from seven to three years,
with the other necessary reforms, would so far extend the influence of the people over their
representatives, as to satisfy us, that biennial elections under the federal system, cannot
possibly be dangerous to the requisite dependence of the house of representatives on their
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size,124 bicameralism,125 subjection of legislators to rule of law,126 legislative
salaries,127 per capita legislator voting,128 publication of each chamber’s
Journal,129 publishing of accounting,130 member residency requirements,131
and electoral processes,132 among others.133 As Federalist 57 explained,
these provisions together would provide “every security which can be
devised or desired for [ensuring legislators’] fidelity to their constituents.”134
Having created a system to transfer political intentions from constituents
to legislators, the Constitution then envisioned a second transfer: from

constituents.”); THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 99, at 384 (James Madison) (describing
the Constitution as containing “such a limitation of the term of appointments, as will maintain
a proper responsibility to the people”); id. at 386 (“[T]he House of Representatives is so
constituted as to support in the members an habitual recollection of their dependence on the
people. Before the sentiments impressed on their minds by the mode of their elevation, can
be effaced by the exercise of power, they will be compelled to anticipate the moment when
their power is to cease, when their exercise of it is to be reviewed . . . .”); THE FEDERALIST NO.
37, supra note 99, at 234 (James Madison) (“The genius of Republican liberty, seems to
demand . . . that those entrusted with [power] should be kept in dependence on the people, by
a short duration of their appointments . . . .”).
124. U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2–3; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, supra note 99, at 378
(James Madison) (noting that the unity of each state’s interests rebuts the claim that the House
“will be too small to possess a due knowledge of the interests of its constituents”); see also
AMAR, supra note 100, at 79–80 (outlining Madison’s arguments for a large House of
Representatives).
125. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 99 (James
Madison); THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 99, at 418 (James Madison) (“It is a misfortune
incident to republican government . . . that those who administer it, may forget their
obligations to their constituents, and prove unfaithful to their important trust. In this point of
view, a senate, as a second branch of the legislative assembly, distinct from, and dividing the
power with, a first, must be in all cases a salutary check on the government.”).
126. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 99, at 386 (James Madison) (noting that the
provision that the House “can make no law which will not have its full operation on themselves
and their friends . . . has always been deemed one of the strongest bonds by which human
policy can connect the rulers and the people together” and “creates between them that
communion of interests and sympathy of sentiments”).
127. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 6. In addition to allowing a broader segment of society to run for
office, mandatory salaries prevented members from forgoing a salary, an action that might
decrease their sense of obligation or indebtedness to the electorate. For related observations,
see AMAR, supra note 100, at 72–74 (discussing the constitutional salary provision as
preventing the forgoing of a salary as a form of bribing electorates in colonial America).
128. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (providing one vote for each Senator). Under the Articles of
Confederation, voting had been by state, not by member, a system which allowed electors to
avoid public accountability. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V. The
Constitution was not explicit about a one-vote rule for the House.
129. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 5. Publication pressured members to advocate for positions in
line with those of their constituents, who would learn if they failed to do so.
130. Id. art. I, § 9. This would serve a similar function to the Journal publication
requirement.
131. See id. art. I, §§ 2–3; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, supra note 99 (James Madison).
132. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 99 (James Madison).
133. Census and apportionment rules, for example, were meant to ensure that these
constituent desires were conveyed in the proper proportions, at least in the House. See U.S.
CONST. art. I, § 2. On the Senate, see infra Parts V.A.2, V.B.1.
134. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57, supra note 99, at 385 (James Madison).
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legislators to statutes.135 Here, legislators would use their Article I, Section
7 power to produce statutes that encoded, and therefore might carry forward,
their political objectives.
This assumption about legislation—that it can provide a vehicle for the
transfer of legislator intentions—accords with common sense. Consider an
example: Imagine that legislators enact a statute meant to lower taxes. If
legislation genuinely cannot accomplish a transfer of legislator intent, then
there would not be a better-than-random chance that the resulting statute
would be interpreted to lower taxes. Instead, it would have an equal chance
of being understood by good-faith interpreters as an effort to accomplish
virtually any possible objective—e.g., to raise taxes, rename a post office,
declare war, or expand environmental protections. Intuitively, we know that
this is untrue: no one seriously thinks that legislative power affords
legislators no communicative control over statutory meaning.136 Put
differently, it is clear that legislation affords a plausible vehicle to transfer
political intentions into (or via) a text.137
This hypothetical also illustrates the constitutional significance of intent
transference at this transition point—in particular, its essential role in
democratic self-government.138 Imagine, for example, that legislators are
135. On the theoretical imperative to identify a connection between these two nodes, see
Raz, supra note 66, at 258, 265–66 (“It makes no sense to give any person or body law-making
power unless it is assumed that the law they make is the law they intended to make. . . . [T]he
notion of legislation imports the idea of entrusting power over the law into the hands of a
person or an institution, and this imports entrusting voluntary control over the development of
the law, or an aspect of it, into the hands of the legislator.”).
136. Even textualists who otherwise disavow a role for intent sometimes implicitly
acknowledge this, such as in their emphasis on legislation as a tool to accomplish legislative
compromises. See, e.g., Manning, supra note 12, at 1913–14; Scalia, supra note 11, at 517
(arguing for textualism as a methodology that creates a “background rule of law against which
Congress can legislate”).
137. See Mathew D. McCubbins & Daniel B. Rodriguez, Statutory Meanings: Deriving
Interpretive Principles from a Theory of Communication and Lawmaking, 76 BROOK. L. REV.
979, 982 (2011) (applying transmission theory of communication and interpretation); Nelson,
supra note 48, at 454 (describing legislative supremacy as making it “surely desirable for there
to be some connection between what members of the enacting Congress understood
themselves to be doing and what judges take them to have done”); Raz, supra note 66, at 258–
59 (“But if so, why does it matter who the members of the legislature are, whether they are
democratically elected or not, whether they represent different regions in the country, or
classes in the population, whether they are adults or children, sane or insane? Since the law
they will end by making does not represent their intentions, the fact that their intentions are
foolish or wise, partial or impartial, self-serving or public spirited, makes no difference.”); see
also Manning, supra note 3, at 691 (“If statutory construction bore no relation to the law the
legislator intended to make, it would mean very little to say that ours is a system marked,
within constitutional boundaries, by legislative supremacy.”).
138. In his Tanner Lectures, Justice Breyer aptly described this transfer as central to the
Constitution’s “democratic objectives”—which, as he put it, aim to “translate[] the general
desire of the public for certain ends, through the legislator’s efforts to embody those ends in
legislation, into a set of statutory words that will carry out those general objectives.” Stephen
Breyer, Assoc. Just., U.S. Sup. Ct., Harvard University Tanner Lectures on Human Values:
Our Democratic Constitution (Nov. 17–19, 2004), https://www.supremecourt.gov/publicinfo/
speeches/sp_11-17-04.html [https://perma.cc/9CG8-EQVY]; see also id. (observing that
“[l]egislation in a ‘delegated democracy’ is meant to embody the people’s will”).
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elected on a platform of lowering taxes. Once elected, the legislators work
under intense pressure from their constituents to lower taxes. They sit down,
draft, and enact a bill meant to lower taxes. However, legislation affords
them no communicative control over statutory meaning, so they are unable
to use the bill as a vehicle to transfer their intent to lower taxes. As a result,
they produce a statute that instead is understood, say, to outlaw health
insurance—a goal none of them sought, and one never requested by their
constituents. In what sense would the public, by living under that law,
experience meaningful self-government? The law bears no resemblance to
choices and preferences the public communicated into the architecture of
government. And it is the perception of that alignment and causal
relationship—between political desires the public holds as sovereign, and
binding rules it lives under as subjects—that is the hallmark of
self-governance. That alignment becomes impossible (or, no more likely
than random) if statutes cannot provide a transfer of intent.
Across myriad provisions, the Constitution assumed otherwise. Many
constitutional provisions were grounded in the belief that legislation
empowers legislators to transfer political desires into statutes that might
reasonably carry forward those desires.139 These included provisions
relating to the enforcement of federal law,140 subjection of members to

139. See William Penn, Preface to THE FRAME OF THE GOVERNMENT OF THE PROVINCE OF
PENNSYLVANIA IN AMERICA 2 (1682) (vesting of legislative power means that “the people are
a party to the laws”); Breyer, supra note 138 (“[T]he Framers created the Constitution’s
complex governmental mechanism in order better to translate public will, determined through
collective deliberation, into sound public policy.”).
140. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 27, supra note 99, at 175 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that
the “interests of ambition” in legislatures will generate laws responsive “to the motives of
public good,” and that “there is good ground to calculate upon a regular and peaceable
execution of the laws of the Union[,] if its powers are administered with a common share of
prudence”).
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laws,141 legislator qualifications,142 bicameralism,143 Senate structure,144 and
Congress’s enumerated powers,145 as well as Publius’s famous analysis of
faction in Federalist 10.146 Each assumed that statutes provide a means to
advance “the intention of [the people’s] agents,” in the words of Federalist
78.147
Once a binding statute is produced, the act of interpretation then would
convey political intentions across a third transition point: from legal texts to
the executive and judicial branches. The Constitution therefore provided that
statutory interpretation be performed by the President,148 the federal

141. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, supra note 99, at 221 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining
that “the necessity of [the representative] being bound himself and his posterity by the laws to
which he gives his assent” create preenactment motivation to enact laws that the representative
wishes to be subjected to postenactment).
142. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 56, supra note 99, at 379 (James Madison) (“It is a sound
and important principle that the representative ought to be acquainted with the interests and
circumstances of his constituents. But this principle can extend no further than to those
circumstances and interests, to which the authority and care of the representative relate. An
ignorance of a variety of minute and particular objects, which do not lie within the compass
of legislation, is consistent with every attribute necessary to a due performance of the
legislative trust. In determining the extent of information required in the exercise of a
particular authority, recourse then must be had to the objects within the purview of that
authority.”); see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 35, supra note 99, at 222 (Alexander Hamilton)
(“There can be no doubt that in order to a judicious exercise of the power of taxation it is
necessary that the person in whose hands it is should be acquainted with the general genius,
habits and modes of thinking of the people at large and with the resources of the country. And
this is all that can be reasonably meant by a knowledge of the interests and feelings of the
people.”).
143. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 99, at 426 (Alexander Hamilton) (explaining
bicameralism as a response to the facts that the “people can never wilfully betray their own
interest” but “they may possibly be betrayed by the[ir] representatives,” both of which assume
statutes as reliable means of encoding interests); see also id. at 431 (arguing that the highly
democratic nature of the House would motivate the Senate to enact legislation that constitutes
“such a display of enlightened policy, and attachment to the public good, as will divide with
that branch of the legislature, the affections and support of the entire body of the people
themselves,” which could only be accomplished if binding legislation successfully reflected
legislator goals).
144. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 63, supra note 99 (James Madison) (outlining reasons why
the Senate, as designed, was not so autonomous that it might produce legislation unmoored
from constituent pressures, despite long terms and an indirect election).
145. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 44, supra note 99, at 304 (James Madison) (“[I]n every new
application of a general power, the particular powers, which are the means of attaining the
object of the general power, must always necessarily vary with that object[,] and be often
properly varied whilst the object remains the same.”).
146. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison) (regarding majority factions as a
problem because legislative power enables majorities to successfully convert oppressive
intentions into oppressive laws). This leads to further institutional design, with Publius
seeking a diverse legislature encompassing many interests, as this makes majority factions
less likely. See id.
147. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 99, at 525 (Alexander Hamilton).
148. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
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courts,149 and state courts and officers.150 Through these acts of
interpretation, courts ideally would preserve and advance “the constitutional
intentions of the legislature,” as Federalist 78 put it.151
This did not mean that courts would need to be intentionalists—a fact that
highlights the distinction between intentionalism, on the one hand, and the
advancement of legislative intent, on the other. Intentionalism is a particular
method of statutory interpretation: one where courts perform the task of
consciously attempting to locate legislator intent in statutory text.152 This
interpretive method, as well as other methods, may function well or poorly
to advance legislator intentions. It is this underlying function, not the method
used to accomplish it, that is relevant to the constitutional value of democratic
self-government.153 To return to the tax-bill hypothetical: if the public elects
legislators specifically to lower taxes, and legislators enact a statute designed
to lower taxes, yet the courts interpret the statute to outlaw health insurance
(and leave taxes unchanged), then the experience of self-government is
thwarted.154 This is true regardless of the methodology used to reach that
interpretation. In this way, constitutional structure treats the preservation of
legislative intentions as inherently valuable—regardless of the methodology
that steers toward that result.155
Finally, political intentions were designed to transmit across a fourth
transition: from the judicial and executive branches to the public.156 This
would be accomplished via enforcement of laws. Statutes therefore were

149. Id. art. III, § 2; see also THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 99, at 525 (Alexander
Hamilton) (noting that it “belongs to [judges] to ascertain . . . the meaning of any particular
act proceeding from the legislative body” and that “it is the province of the courts to liquidate
and fix [competing statutes’] meaning and operation”).
150. U.S. CONST. art. VI.
151. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 99, at 526 (Alexander Hamilton); see also id. at
525 (noting that courts should attempt to locate “the intention of their agents” in statutes); id.
(noting that “judges ought to be governed by” the “will of the legislature, declared in its
statutes”); id. at 526 (“The courts must declare the sense of the law . . . .”); id. (arguing that
courts should not substitute “their pleasure to that of the legislative body”); THE FEDERALIST
NO. 81, supra note 99, at 545 (Alexander Hamilton) (arguing that courts should not contravene
“the will of the legislature”).
152. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 301–04.
153. See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal Realism, and the Interpretation of
Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RSRV. L. REV. 179, 189–90 (1987) (“[Judges] are
part of an organization, an enterprise—the enterprise of governing the United States—and
when the orders of their superiors are unclear, this does not absolve them from responsibility
for helping to make the enterprise succeed.”).
154. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 59, at 459–60 (using an analogy to executive-branch
interpretation of presidential decisions to underscore statutory interpretation’s connection to
democratic legitimacy).
155. See Breyer, supra note 138 (“[A]n interpretation of a statute that tends to implement
the legislator’s will helps to implement the public’s will and is therefore consistent with the
Constitution’s democratic purpose. For similar reasons an interpretation that undercuts the
statute’s objectives tends to undercut that Constitutional objective.”).
156. This assumes enforcement of judicial interpretations of the law, of course. See
BREYER, supra note 71, at 28 (discussing a quote often attributed to Andrew Jackson in the
wake of Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. 515 (1832): “John Marshall has made his decision,
now let him enforce it.”).
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given a legislative power that would be binding on the public that, under the
Constitution’s vision, ultimately had issued them157—a continuation, yet
modification, of the Articles of Confederation’s earlier project to align power
(as sovereign) with binding consequence (as subject).158
2. Implications for Legislative Theory
This analysis of constitutional structure offers some lessons regarding
disaggregated-intent theory. That theory proposes that legislator intentions
remain relevant to statutory interpretation. As illustrated above, the
Constitution affirms this relevance: it attaches stakes to the preservation of
these intentions, equating their preservation with advancement of a
constitutional value. Far from prohibiting a turn to disaggregated-intent
theory, therefore, the Constitution gives meaning and justification to the
theory’s basic project.
By contrast, intent skeptics’ view of statutes suddenly appears
constitutionally worrisome. That view holds that courts and scholars should
abandon the idea of statutes as vessels for the transfer of intent.159 If the
argument is simply that we should not conceptualize statutes this way, it is
difficult to see why, given that this conceptualization is central to the
constitutional scheme. By discarding the idea of intent transference, we risk
discarding conversation around a pivotal constitutional value (viz.,
democratic self-government) as well, and it is not clear why that should
happen. And if the argument instead is that statutes genuinely cannot transfer
legislative intent, then it becomes unclear how these critics conceptualize
democratic self-government operating in our system.160
Turning from interpretive theory to practice, the foregoing analysis also
justifies conscious efforts to preserve legislator intentions during statutory
interpretation. After all, courts often use statutory interpretation to advance

157. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1 (granting Congress “legislative power”); id. art. I, § 8
(granting Congress the necessary and proper power to “make all Laws” within its assigned
fields); id. art. VI (making federal statutes “supreme Law of the Land”).
158. Under the Articles of Confederation, federal legislators generally had been selected
by state officials—and so their legislation (and judicial interpretations of it) were binding only
upon the states, not the citizens themselves. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V
(providing state legislatures with power to determine selection of delegates); see also THE
FEDERALIST NO. 23, supra note 99, at 148 (Alexander Hamilton) (“[W]e must abandon the
vain project of legislating upon the States in their collective capacities; [w]e must extend the
laws of the federal government to the individual citizens of America . . . .”); AMAR, supra note
100, at 65 (“Because representatives would derive their authority directly from the people,
Americans could confidently entrust the new Congress with authority to legislate directly upon
the citizenry. The old Confederation Congress members had not personally faced the voters
and thus could claim no democratic mandate to lay burdens on them.”).
159. See supra Part I.
160. Professor Ekins also notes that, by removing this idea of intent transfer, skeptics
further struggle to account for legislator participation in the process. See EKINS, supra note 9,
at 11 (“[A]ll fail to make intelligible the reasonable legislator’s participation in the process,
for they do not explain how legislating might change the law in some reasonable way.”).
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structural constitutional values.161 If the Constitution equates preservation
of these legislator intentions with advancement of a constitutional value, then
methods of statutory interpretation justifiably might seek to advance this
constitutional value as well. This would provide courts with good reason to
approach the task of judging as a pragmatic effort to maximize those
legislators whose intentions are fulfilled, and to minimize those who find it
frustrated.162
IV. LEGISLATIVE AUTHORITY AND DISAGGREGATED INTENT
Parts II and III have argued that disaggregated-intent theory is both
theoretically viable and constitutionally permissible. However, perhaps
these parts have recommended a theory that is fundamentally at odds with
the nature of legislation, or of legislative authority. One prominent argument
to this end, developed by Professor Waldron, has garnered particular
attention in the legislation literature.163 Does Waldron’s argument about
legislative authority provide good reason to discard disaggregated-intent
theory?
Answering this question requires a close look at Waldron’s theory of
“unintentional legislation.”164 In his book Law and Disagreement, Waldron
presents modern legislation as “unintentional” in the sense that it cannot (or
should not) be characterized as the direct utterance of a single intentional
actor.165 Instead, he suggests, legislation is better conceptualized as the
product of a mechanistic (i.e., inhuman, nonintentional) selection or
combinatory process.166 In developing this theory, Waldron does not deny

161. See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Quasi-Constitutional Law:
Clear Statement Rules as Constitutional Lawmaking, 45 VAND. L. REV. 593 (1992)
(chronicling and explaining the ways that many canons of construction operate to protect
structural constitutional values).
162. This argument grounds the turn to legislative intent in democratic theory, not in
linguistic necessity. For a version of the linguistic necessity argument, see Doerfler, supra
note 10, at 986–98.
163. For references to Professor Waldron’s argument in legislation scholarship, see
Richard A. Posner, Review of Jeremy Waldron, Law and Disagreement, 100 COLUM. L. REV.
582, 584–85 (2000); Doerfler, supra note 10, at 1024–25, 1039; Manning, supra note 12, at
1918–20; Manning, supra note 3, at 692; Nourse, supra note 19, at 81–85; see also EKINS,
supra note 9, at 9 (citing Professors Dworkin and Waldron as “the most sophisticated
philosophical skeptics”).
164. WALDRON, supra note 63, at 129.
165. See id. at 121 (“My submission is going to be that . . . we will do better by eschewing
any model that regards legislation as most commonly the intentional product of a single
law-making author.”); id. at 127 (viewing intentional legislation as meaning it is the “product
of one person’s coherent intention”); id. at 129 (equating intentional legislation with the notion
that legislation “must embody a particular intention attributable to a language-user”).
Professor Waldron does acknowledge a minimal intention of the legislature to have its statutes
understood according to their conventional meanings. See id. at 142–43 (“The intentional
description will be that such-and-such words were used with their conventional English
meaning. That, however, is all there is to say about the institution’s intentions.”).
166. See, e.g., id. 126 (outlining Richard Wollheim’s idea of a “democratic machine” that
aggregates legislator inputs and arguing that it provides the most compelling understanding of
the modern legislature).
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that individual legislators make intentional inputs into this mechanistic
process.167 Rather, he emphasizes that those intentional inputs simply do not
have direct and final control over the statutory text’s content, which instead
is left up to subsequent processes.168
While Waldron acknowledges the presence of intentional inputs by
individual legislators, he further argues that statutory interpretation should
not attend to these inputs. For Waldron, this conclusion follows from the
nature of modern legislative authority.169 As Waldron puts it, “the best
arguments for the authority of statutes produced under [modern] conditions
are arguments which actually preclude any appeal to the intentions of
particular legislators as a general interpretive strategy.”170 He argues that the
nature of legislative authority means that “we would do best to abandon all
talk of such intentionality” and instead should attend only to “the linguistic
meaning . . . of the legislative text itself.”171
As Waldron acknowledges, the persuasiveness of his account relies on the
accuracy of his basic depiction of the modern legislature—by which he
means, the legislature in a diverse, pluralistic society.172 In such a society,
he takes the key traits of the legislature to be its numerosity, diversity, and
disagreement.173 For this type of legislature, he argues, legislation’s

167. See, e.g., id. at 127 (acknowledging that “those inputs [by individual legislators] are
fully intentional”); id. at 128 (stating that “each of the latter actions—the individual actions—
is of course the product of an intention”).
168. See id. at 121 (“[T]heir ability to integrate a diversity of purposes, interests, and aims
among their members into the text of a single legislative product” has authority “only by virtue
of the way in which it combines the interests and knowledge of its members in the act of
legislating.”).
169. See id. (“We must ask, then, whether there is anything true in general about the way
in which statutes are produced that makes appeal to legislators’ intentions a proper strategy of
interpretation. How we answer that question will depend on what we take to be the most
helpful general model of the legislative process, so far as theories of authority are
concerned.”); id. (arguing that he is examining “theories of legal authority (and any
concomitant theories of interpretation)”); id. at 138 (“I also want to argue that in the case of
each of these processes, any reason we have for according Raz-ian authority to the resultant
legislation is also a reason for discounting the authority of the views or intentions of particular
legislators considered on their own.”); id. at 144 (contending that his theory is anchored in
“the political authority of a legislature”).
170. Id. at 122; see also id. at 119 (framing his argument as a rejection of the “initially
appealing answer . . . that we should interpret the statute in the way the legislators intended,
resolving any vagueness or ambiguity by finding out as much as we can about what the
legislators had in mind”).
171. Id. at 142.
172. See, e.g., id. at 127 (“The interesting question is which picture is more helpful for our
thinking about the intentionality of statutes under modern legislative conditions.”); id. at 121;
id. at 144 (asserting that “the elementary circumstance of modern politics is plurality”).
173. See id. at 123 (“I shall assume . . . that the legislators are a diverse body of people,
drawn from different groups in a heterogeneous and multicultural society. I assume in other
words that there is very little in the way of shared cultural and social understandings among
them . . . .”). According to Waldron, these traits explain why written texts are essential to the
modern legislative process: they provide a focal point that prevents legislative debate among
differing parties from disintegrating into chaos. Statutory text therefore provides the tool that
enables coordinated legislation in the face of disagreement, entitling it to our respect. See, e.g.,
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authority is derived primarily from the feat accomplished in the mechanistic,
combinatory process of producing legislation in the face of pervasive
disagreement—not from the inherent authority of any particular voice in the
legislature. If so, he observes, it makes sense not to conflate any legislator’s
individual policy goal or preference with an authoritative view.
It is understandable that, for this legislature, Waldron would conclude that
certain ways of using legislator intent are off-limits. Less clear, however, is
why Waldron believes that his vision of legislative authority allows
interpreters to disregard any shared understandings of legislative text that
prevailed among the enacting legislators. Waldron seems to give only one
defense of this disregard for legislator understandings—and it relies on a
view of the legislature that has been undermined by recent research.
To make this defense, Waldron returns to the premise of diversity in the
modern legislature. According to Waldron, we cannot assume that the
“modern” legislature is one drawn from a homogenous society marked by
consensus or by a large, shared set of linguistic and cultural practices. Under
these conditions, he says, statutory text plays a particular function in the
legislature. He explains:
[W]e must assume we are not dealing with persons . . . who share a
comprehensive body of common understandings. Legislators will come to
the chamber from different communities, with different ideologies, and
different perspectives . . . . The only thing they have in common, in their
diversity and in the welter of rhetoric and mutual misunderstanding that
counts for modern political debate, is the given text of the measure
currently under consideration. That is constituted by the conventions of the
shared official language as the only landmark, the only point of reference
or co-ordination, in a sea of possible misunderstanding—and even then it
is fragile enough and always liable to fly apart on account of the fragility
of shared meanings.174

In other words, interpreters need not attend to legislator understandings of
statutory text because, given the nature of a numerous and diverse legislature,
those understandings naturally will be captured by plain meaning
interpretation.
This line of argument relies on claims about the modern legislature that, in
light of recent research into the contemporary Congress, now appear difficult
to sustain. First, Waldron asserts that statutory text is necessary, in a
legislature marked by plurality, to prevent the legislative process from
spiraling into discord and confusion. Yet Congress often proceeds quite
productively without any statutory text. For instance, the U.S. Senate
Committee on Finance—one of the most powerful committees in Congress—
holds its markups as “conceptual markups” that occur without any bill

id. at 108 (“A piece of legislation deserves respect because of the achievement it represents in
the circumstances of politics: action-in-concert in the face of disagreement.”).
174. Id. at 145.
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text.175 Moreover, even when bill text is present in Congress, it often is mere
pretext and unrelated to the unfolding (and again, sometimes quite
productive) debate.176 Congress therefore seems to do just fine in advancing
policies and structuring debate in the absence of a focal statutory text. This
alone raises concerns about Waldron’s assumptions on the degree of plurality
in the legislature, and on the role it requires of statutory text.
More importantly, developments in Congress also have provided reason to
revise Waldron’s claim about legislator understanding of statutory text.
Waldron suggests that legislators, because they are coming from drastically
different backgrounds, are unlikely to successfully communicate with each
other except through the vehicle of a statutory text interpreted via its plain
meaning.177 However, the “process-based turn”178 in legislation scholarship
has undermined this idea. This recent work in legislative studies (by myself
and others) has established that, as Congress has become a modern
bureaucratic institution, a coherent interpretive community has formed
within Congress—one that has developed its own interpretive lens and
interpretive practices for understanding statutes.179 When legislators (and
their staffs) read bills, this work has shown, they apply the interpretive lens
this scholarship has uncovered.180 That provides the foundation for shared
meaning, not an interpretation under a plain meaning interpretive lens.
Put differently, recent scholarship has shown that the legislature, at least
in the case of Congress, is a modern bureaucratic institution.181 And
175. See Press Release, U.S. Senate Committee on Finance, Hatch Unveils Pro-Growth,
Pro-Jobs, and Pro-Family Tax Overhaul Plan (Nov. 9, 2017), https://www.finance.senate.gov/
chairmans-news/hatch-unveils-pro-growth-pro-jobs-pro-family-tax-overhaul-plan[https://perma.cc/HS28-TC5B] (“The Senate Finance Committee traditionally holds
conceptual markups, meaning the legislation is debated and examined as a detailed narrative,
rather than actual bill text.”). Moreover, even when bill text is present in Congress, it
sometimes is mere pretext and unrelated to the unfolding (and, again, sometimes quite
productive) debate.
176. For example, committees regularly conduct markups while being aware that a
manager’s amendment or amendment in the nature of a substitute is planned to replace the
existing bill at a subsequent legislative stage, and members perform the technicality of
proposing to amend statutory text, often by proposing to “strike the last word,” in order to
open discussion on elements of the legislation unrelated to that text-based motion.
177. See WALDRON, supra note 63, at 123. This claim is also at odds with common sense,
as this ostensibly modern vision of the legislature actually is rather antiquated. In an era of
homogenized national culture in the United States (including political culture), national
politicians surely share a vocabulary that is richer than any bare overlap of linguistic “plain
meaning.” To use an example from the “plain meaning” literature: two elected officials in
the present-day United States surely share a far richer set of cultural, linguistic, and
interpretive assumptions than a contemporary Senator shares with, say, an Australian
newspaper reader from the 1800s.
178. For a review of this scholarship, see supra notes 18–19.
179. This was emphasized in the recent study conducted by Professors Jesse M. Cross and
Abbe R. Gluck. See generally Cross & Gluck, supra note 18.
180. See id.
181. See, e.g., Bressman & Gluck, supra note 10, at 755 (“Congress is a big
bureaucracy . . . .”); Cross & Gluck, supra note 18, at 1543 (“Congress has a bureaucracy.”);
Cross, Legislative History, supra note 18, at 93 (“In short, Congress has been transformed into
something that it did not resemble prior to the 1970s: a large, modern bureaucratic
institution.”).
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bureaucracies do not handle plural, diverse membership in the way Waldron
posits. According to Waldron, legislatures manage this diversity by falling
back upon bare linguistic meaning, which is presumed available to all, and
thereby abandon the possibility of any richer institutional interpretive
practices.182 However, bureaucracies typically take a different approach.
They develop institutional interpretive practices, and they pair those
interpretive practices with familiar bureaucratic tools (e.g., explanatory
briefings and memoranda; staffing of principals with institutionally
acculturated staff) to render accessible the interpretive assumptions that
prevail within the institution.183 Anyone who has worked in a large
institution with a heterogeneous workforce knows this about bureaucracies,
and about the shared meanings that are created within them. In the case of
Congress, we now have research that has confirmed this practice.
In light of recent scholarly developments, therefore, it is implausible to
assume that those inside Congress rely on plain meaning interpretive
practices to develop their shared understandings of statutory text, or that the
possibility of legislator difference requires them to do so. This is noteworthy,
given that legislators’ shared understandings seem to provide the foundation
for legislative authority under the various theories proffered by Waldron.184
182. See WALDRON, supra note 63, at 142.
183. On the role of staff memos and briefings in educating members of Congress on
legislation, see Cross, Staffer’s Error Doctrine, supra note 18, at 100.
184. Over the course of his analyses, Waldron outlines five theories of legislative authority
that he suggests are available to modern legislatures. These might be labeled as: coordinative
authority, majoritarian authority, and three types of Razian authority—utilitarian,
Condorcetian, and individual Aristotelian. On coordinative authority, see WALDRON, supra
note 63, at 108 (“A piece of legislation deserves respect because of the achievement it
represents in the circumstances of politics: action-in-concert in the face of disagreement.”).
Here, the resulting authority presumably would attach to the understanding of statutory text
that actually prevailed in the legislature and thereby performed the coordinating function. On
majoritarian authority, see id. at 113 (arguing that a majority decision gains authority because
it “giv[es] positive decisional weight to the fact that a given individual member of the group
holds a certain view”). This authority therefore relies on implementation actually capturing
the “certain view” held by the majority. On utilitarian authority, see id. at 132–34 (explaining
that, if inputs by each legislator express the legislator’s (or her constituents’) particular
interest, then aggregation of those interests in a statute can claim to represent the general
interest). Such utilitarian authority relies upon capturing the wisdom of the collective group—
and that, in turn, relies on capturing the interpretation assumed by the group members when
inputting their wisdom. On Condorcetian authority, see id. at 134–36 (contending that, when
each legislator votes on her understanding of what is best for everyone and on a question where
each has a better-than-even chance of being correct, each individual will do better by trusting
an aggregative vote on the right answer than their own individual assessment). As with the
utilitarian conception, this concept relies on capturing the wisdom of collective group inputs
based on their understanding of policy alternatives. On individual Aristotelian authority, see
id. at 136–38 (theorizing that deliberation produces a synthesis in the mind of each legislator
that produces better policies than any one actor could devise alone). Here, authority relies on
the statute capturing the policy that legislators have in mind once this synthesis occurs; any
interpretation that fails to capture it loses the Aristotelian deliberative benefits (and
presumably the claim to authority). Waldron also notes a sixth form of legislative authority,
group Aristotelian authority, which presumably would not attach to a legislator’s
understanding of the policy, but he concludes this form of authority likely is not available to
legislatures. See id. at 141.

2250

FORDHAM LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

If so—if shared legislator understandings and inputs do remain relevant—
then statutory-interpretation theory must retain a space to consciously
consider and pursue those understandings. In this sense, statutory
interpretation must continue to care about legislator intent.
V. DISAGGREGATED-INTENT THEORY AND INTENTIONALISM
The foregoing parts have argued that disaggregated-intent theory is
theoretically viable, constitutionally defensible, and in accord with
Waldron’s skeptical conception of legislative authority. As this part
explains, disaggregated-intent theory also is useful: it unlocks new
understandings of interpretive methodology, providing a potential
opportunity to move beyond existing stalemates in our methodological
debates. To illustrate this, this part will explain how one method of statutory
interpretation—intentionalism—appears different under disaggregatedintent theory.
A. Understanding Intentionalism
As previously noted, intentionalism is a longstanding, well-established
method of statutory interpretation.185 It treats the task of interpretation as the
explicit search of statutory text, perhaps with support of secondary sources,
for legislative intent.186 In other words, the methodology assigns the
interpreter a specific task: to locate the interpretation that, if the text had
been composed by an intentional actor bestowed with legislative power, is
the best guess of the intention that such actor would have been pursuing in
the composition of the text.187 Subject to some exceptions discussed in Part
V.B, intentionalism instructs courts to locate and apply that meaning.
What does disaggregated-intent theory add to our understanding of this
interpretive practice? For one thing, it offers a useful way to conceptualize
it—namely, as a search for a collection of congruent individual legislator
intentions. Understood as such, the intent sought by intentionalism is not
necessarily fictive, even if we accept critiques of collective intent. This fact
allows intentionalism to survive the challenge raised by intent skeptics,
thereby rendering the methodology more theoretically defensible.188
Moreover, for reasons discussed in Part III, disaggregated-intent theory
also unlocks an understanding of why intentionalism is potentially valuable.
It implies that intentionalism can be understood as a strategy to maximize the
constitutional value of democratic self-government—a goal it equates with
the maximal preservation of a certain type of legislator intention.189 Once
we view intentionalism in this way, democratic theory provides defensible
185. See supra notes 39–50 and accompanying text.
186. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 301–04.
187. For the argument that this methodology is not the best way to advance legislative
intent, see Nelson, supra note 32, at 351 n.10, 380–82.
188. On the idea of intent simply as a fiction and heuristic, see JAMES WILLARD HURST,
DEALING WITH STATUTES 32–33 (1982).
189. See supra Part III.
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answers to many questions that, according to prior theorists, intentionalism
has trouble answering (or answering satisfactorily). These include questions
regarding (1) how many legislators must share an intention, (2) which type of
legislator intention is relevant, and (3) how far one must go in promoting that
intention. This part examines the answers that disaggregated-intent theory
provides to each of these questions. In so doing, it shows that
disaggregated-intent theory provides a lens through which to view the
intentionalism—and criteria through which to evaluate it.
1. Requisite Number of Intending Legislators
One question that has plagued intentionalism has asked: how many
legislators must share an intent in order for it to be credited by an
intentionalist court? It has been argued that the intention must be shared by
a legislative majority,190 a supermajority capable of enacting law,191 and the
entire legislature.192 In addition to positing standards that conflict with each
190. See, e.g., Int’l Brotherhood of Elec. Workers v. NLRB, 814 F.2d 697, 718 (D.C. Cir.
1987) (Buckley, J., concurring) (“A committee’s purposes cannot be imputed to Congress as
a whole, and references to committee action (or inaction) on the Senate floor will not change
this fact. . . . [I]t cannot be said that Congress—which acts through a majority of its 535
members—expressed any opinion whatever on the merits of [a committee] proposal . . . .”).
For a summary of work invoking this standard, see Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The
Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 599
(1995) (describing the critiques that target the idea “that at least a majority of legislators had
the same intent or broad purpose in mind”); see also DWORKIN, supra note 65, at 320–21
(posing alternatives of a majority decision, plurality decision, and representative decision rule
and suggesting that the multiple options pose a problem for intentionalist theory); GERALD C.
MACCALLUM, JR., LEGISLATIVE INTENT AND OTHER ESSAYS ON LAW, POLITICS, AND MORALITY
26 (Marcus G. Singer & Rex Martin eds., 1993); EKINS, supra note 9, at 6–7, 218–19 (noting
the “majority model” and the “agency model” and the differing number of legislators each
requires).
191. See Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 58, at 63 (“If the meaning the Court gives
to the law today had been spelled out, together with its implications, would the bill have been
passed? The answer often will be no. That answer should reveal the problems of the
technique. It produces ‘laws’ that could not be passed.”); Manning, supra note 7, at 2409
(“[T]he relevant question is whether the legislature—constrained by the legislative process—
would have been able to agree on wording that would include or exclude the troubling
application or omission.”).
192. See Green v. Bock Laundry Mach. Co., 490 U.S. 504, 528 (1989) (Scalia, J.,
concurring) (“The meaning of terms on the statute books ought to be determined, not on the
basis of which meaning can be shown to have been understood by a larger handful of the
Members of Congress; but rather on the basis of which meaning is (1) most in accord with
context and ordinary usage, and thus most likely to have been understood by the whole
Congress which voted on the words of the statute . . . .”); Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S.
174, 192 (1988) (Scalia, J., concurring) (“It is at best dangerous to assume that all the
necessary participants in the law-enactment process are acting upon the same unexpressed
assumptions.”); John F. Manning, Without the Pretense of Legislative Intent, 130 HARV. L.
REV. 2397, 2406 (2017) (“[E]xactly whose intentions should count in the tabulation of
‘Congress’s intent?’ Is it the intentions of the entire Congress, the enacting majority, the
legislators who drafted the bill, the agency officials who helped shape it, or perhaps the
President who signed it? And even if one could decide that a particular group’s intention is
dispositive (say, the enacting majority), how does one sum up the intentions of its members if
they are not all of one mind on the question at hand?” (footnotes omitted)); Radin, supra note
46, at 870 (arguing the implausibility “that of several hundred [legislators] each will have
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other, this scholarship has set discouragingly high thresholds that must be
met for any attribution of intent—ones that seem to make intentionalism
unlikely to succeed in many cases.
Viewed as a means of promoting democratic self-government, however,
intentionalism requires a different (and lower) standard. Here, intentionalism
is understood as a strategy to maximize the constitutional value of democratic
self-government, and to accomplish this by maximizing the preservation of a
certain type of legislator intention. Under this view, the goal simply is to get
the intent correct for the greatest number of legislators that one can. It does
not matter that an intent may not have been shared by the full Congress, had
majority support, or been filibuster-proof. When courts look to promote a
constitutional value in statutory interpretation, they typically do not have a
cutoff threshold to trigger its relevance. Disaggregated-intent theory,
because it reframes intentionalism as a strategy to advance a constitutional
value, suggests that the same logic should apply to the promotion of legislator
intent.193 Courts must apply the provision somehow—and constitutional
values recommend that they do so in the most democratically available way,
regardless of just how democratic that option might be.
2. Choosing Among Types of Intention
Disaggregated-intent theory also clarifies the type of intent that
intentionalism seeks to locate. As Part III.B explained, this theory views a
particular intent transfer, in which legislator intent is embedded in statutory
text, as one step in a chain of intent transfers. It equates the recovery of that
intention—of the policy that legislators intend to use their vote to
communicate forward in the architecture of government—with the
advancement of the constitutional value of democratic self-government.194
This, it explains, is why various constitutional pressures are made to weigh
on legislators specifically in the moment of voting: it is their intention to use
that vote to support enactment of specific substantive policies, as they
understand them, that is relevant to the constitutional project.
In this way, constitutional structure directs attention to what might be
termed the post-consolidation intention of the legislator. This intention is
not “post-consolidation” in that it refers to any consolidation of legislator

exactly the same determinate situations in mind as possible reductions of a given
determinable”); Scalia, supra note 3, at 32–34, 35–37 (arguing that the legislative record
cannot be evidence of “legislative intent” because it does not represent views of all members).
But see Patricia M. Wald, The Sizzling Sleeper: The Use of Legislative History in Construing
Statutes in the 1988–89 Term of the United States Supreme Court, 39 AM. U. L. REV. 277, 307
(1990) (“To disregard committee reports on the ground that all congress-persons do not
consider or rely upon these reports is equally problematic. First, it denies legitimacy to all
materials, even statutes, that have not been personally read by all the members of a
Congress . . . .”).
193. Judge Richard A. Posner has been read as reaching a similar conclusion on the proper
threshold of legislator assent. See Farber & Frickey, supra note 59, at 461–63 (reading Judge
Posner’s model as picking the interpretation with the greatest likelihood of being correct).
194. See supra Part III.B.
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intentions into a single, institutional intent. Rather, it refers to the intention
that each legislator forms with respect to the consolidated legislative product.
Our system presumes that the nature of the law-writing task—and by
extension, the interpretation that fleshes out its meaning195—is that
legislators must reduce a plurality of competing hopes and desires to a single
set of instructions.196 This consolidation is presumed necessary to advance
another constitutional value—the rule of law—and to thereby prevent “a
hydra in government, from which nothing but contradiction and confusion
can proceed,” as Federalist 80 put it.197 It is the intentions that legislators
commit to with respect to this consolidated legislative product—this focal
legislative proposal—that presumably are the objects of an intentionalism
grounded in the promotion of democratic self-government.
By clarifying that intentionalism is focused on post-consolidation intent,
disaggregated-intent theory addresses two separate criticisms of
intentionalism that Judge Easterbrook particularly has emphasized. First,
Easterbrook has criticized intentionalism as a methodology that is
insufficiently respectful of the legislative process.198 According to
Easterbrook, “the whole process of interpretation from intent is an end run
around process.”199 Intentionalism therefore is troubling for Easterbrook, an
interpreter who believes that “process is the essence of legislation”—and
that, consequently, legislative supremacy requires the use of interpretive
methods that are sufficiently deferential to that legislative process.200
Understood as a method of seeking legislators’ post-consolidation
intentions, however, intentionalism actually is remarkably deferential to
legislative process—perhaps even too deferential, and certainly more so than
Easterbrook’s approach. In particular, intentionalism is highly deferential to
the two acts of consolidation that define the democratic process—the
electoral and enactment consolidations. Rather than second-guessing those
consolidations or attempting to correct for their imperfections, intentionalism
195. On the extension of Article III judicial power to federal statutes as an effort to promote
uniformity in interpretation of federal law, see THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 99, at 535
(Alexander Hamilton) (“If there are such things as political axioms, the propriety of the
judicial power of a government being co-extensive with its legislative, may be ranked among
the number. The mere necessity of uniformity in the interpretation of the national laws,
decides the question.”).
196. For a reflection on this consolidation role of this transition, see Robert H. Jackson,
Problems of Statutory Interpretation, 8 F.R.D. 121, 125 (1948).
197. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80, supra note 99, at 535 (Alexander Hamilton). But see
generally Ryan Doerfler, Can a Statute Have More Than One Meaning?, 94 N.Y.U. L. REV.
213 (2019).
198. See Frank H. Easterbrook, What Does Legislative History Tell Us?, 66 CHI.-KENT L.
REV. 441, 445 (1990) [hereinafter Easterbrook, Legislative History] (“What distinguishes laws
from the results of opinion polls conducted among legislators is that the laws survived a
difficult set of procedural hurdles and either passed by a two-thirds vote or obtained the
President’s signature.”); Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 58, at 64 (“[T]he technique
assumes that intentions are ‘the law.’ Why are they? If we took an opinion poll of Congress
today on a raft of issues and found out its views, would those views become the law? Certainly
not. They must run the gamut of the process . . . .”).
199. Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 58, at 65.
200. Id. at 64.
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leaves it to other political actors to ensure that the consolidations occur
properly. It assumes they have been successful, and it offers an interpretive
approach that advances a constitutional value only if they are, indeed, a
success.
Consider the first consolidation point: that which is accomplished by the
electoral process. Here, a large community of voters is consolidated into a
smaller number of representatives. Ideally, the electoral process that
performs this consolidation would recreate the voting community in
miniature.201 It would create a legislative body that holds the same political
interests as the larger community, and in the same proportions.
The Constitution did not actually accomplish this goal with Congress, of
course. While Congress was in several ways a fuller achievement of mimetic
representation than its predecessor legislatures had been,202 it still contained
many distortions of the voting public. In the Senate, small states were
overrepresented.203 At the Founding, slave states were overrepresented in
the House.204 The House also suffered from intrastate malapportionments,205
and present-day rules requiring a representative for each state and capping
the legislature at 435 representatives create continued distortions.206 As a
result, federal legislators consistently have represented unequal numbers of
voters.
These unbalanced representations raise a question for statutory interpreters
interested in advancing democratic self-government. Should interpreters
second-guess this flawed electoral act of consolidation and attempt to undo
the distortions they perceive in it? If so, it might make sense to
disproportionately value the voices of legislators who represent greater
populations. Such an approach would emphasize the voices of larger states
over those of smaller states. In Founding-era statutes, it would prioritize to
some extent the voices of the free states over those of the slave states.
Although Part V.B.1 ultimately will question this, it is possible that such an
approach might more robustly promote democratic self-government—
applying the interpretation of laws that was presumed or desired by the
representatives who stood in for greater numbers of voters. However, it also
would second-guess the consolidation process that the Constitution and
Congress had established. It would not view the Constitution’s consolidation

201. On this goal, see supra note 116 and accompanying text.
202. See AMAR, supra note 100, at 79–85 (noting the Constitution’s improvements on
enumeration and apportionment over its predecessors).
203. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 3 (providing each state with two Senators).
204. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (providing for slaves to be counted as “three fifths of
all other Persons” added onto slave state apportionment tabulations).
205. See AMAR, supra note 100, at 97.
206. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2 (requiring at least one representative per state);
Reapportionment Act of 1929 § 22, 2 U.S.C. § 2a, invalidated by Ariz. State Legislature v.
Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm’n, 135 S. Ct. 2652 (2015) (capping the size of the House).
For a discussion of these many present-day distortions and for a proposal to correct them, see
generally Comment, Pack the Union: A Proposal to Admit New States for the Purpose of
Amending the Constitution to Ensure Equal Representation, 133 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (2020).
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process as having created legislators with equal voices, despite the
Constitution assigning them equal votes.207
This is not the approach traditionally taken by intentionalism. Instead,
despite the fact that some legislators represent more voters than others,
intentionalism typically treats each legislator voice equally.208 Or, to the
extent it weighs voices differently, it does so by reference to factors such as
proximity to a legislative decision—not voters represented.209 On occasion,
this actually leads intentionalism to correct for distortions in the
representative system—in particular, by giving weight to the voices of
nonvoting legislators.210 Typically, however, this approach maintains (and
potentially extends) democratic defects in this consolidation process.211
Intentionalism is equally deferential at the second consolidation point:
from representatives to binding laws. Here, a collection of legislators must
distill their competing political desires to a single, binding text.

207. The Constitution is explicit about Senators each having one vote, U.S. CONST. art. I,
§ 3, presumably to distinguish the Senate from its predecessor under the Articles, under which
states voted in state delegations. See ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781, art. V (“In
determining questions in the united states, in Congress assembled, each state shall have one
vote.”). The Constitution left the one-vote rule implicit in the House.
208. See ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 301–04.
209. See id. at 631 (reviewing conventional use of legislative history documents).
210. See, e.g., Fontenot v. Hunter, 378 F. Supp. 3d 1075, 1098 (W.D. Okla. 2019) (citing
the statement of an American Samoa representative as evidence of legislative intent); Native
Am. Arts, Inc. v. J.C. Penney Co., 5 F. Supp. 2d 599, 608 (N.D. Ill. 1998) (same).
211. This deference that intentionalism gives to the electoral act of consolidation can be
conceptualized in several ways. First, it might be viewed as a form of respect for the tradeoffs
and deals that were necessary to create a federal government founded on democratic
self-government to begin with. This would perceive in the Constitution a set of compromises
like those textualists often see in ordinary legislation. For support of this view, see THE
FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 99, at 416 (James Madison) (“The equality of representation
in the senate is another point, which, being evidently the result of compromise between the
opposite pretensions of the large and the small States, does not call for much discussion.”);
see also MICHAEL J. KLARMAN, THE FRAMERS’ COUP: THE MAKING OF THE UNITED STATES
CONSTITUTION 201 (2016) (explaining the Constitutional Convention’s voting structure that
gave small states leverage to achieve this compromise). Second, it might be viewed as
embodying a respect for additional constitutional values that are embedded in the design of
the Congress, such as a balance in the Senate of democratic self-government and respect for
state sovereignty. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 99, at 417 (James Madison) (“[T]he
equal vote allowed to each state, is at once a constitutional recognition of the portion of
sovereignty remaining in the individual states, and an instrument for preserving that residuary
sovereignty.”); id. at 416 (“If indeed it be right that among a people thoroughly incorporated
into one nation, every district ought to have a proportional share in the government[,] and that
among independent and sovereign states bound together by a simple league, the parties
however unequal in size ought to have an equal share in the common councils, it does not
appear to be without some reason that in a compound republic partaking both of the national
and federal character, the government ought to be founded on a mixture of the principles of
proportional and equal representation.”). Third, with the Senate, this deference might be
understood as advancing a different form of representation in which individuals are
represented in their collective capacity as citizens of a state. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 39,
supra note 99, at 254 (James Madison) (describing the House as requiring the concurrence of
“a majority of the people” and the Senate “a majority of the States”). Nonetheless, however
conceptualized, the consolidation point of elections is clearly flawed from a democratic
self-government perspective.
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Intentionalism does not look to question this act of consolidation; it does not
seek the pre-consolidation desires of legislators.212 This is where
disaggregated-intent theory clarifies the intentionalist project in the face of
Judge Easterbrook’s concerns.213 When Easterbrook equates intentionalism
with “[taking] an opinion poll of Congress [to find] out its views” and
permitting those views to “become the law,”214 he imagines that
intentionalists seek to identify the raw political desires of legislators.215
Under the disaggregated-intent view, however, this is not why intentionalists
presumably care about the viewpoints that legislators express during the
legislative process. Rather, intentionalists value statements of individual
political desire by legislators because, in the context of a discussion of a
specific piece of legislation, those statements carry an implied corollary that
effectively says, “I understand this bill, this consolidated document, does (or
will) address these desires that I am expressing.” In other words,
intentionalists are not understood to seek the pre-consolidation desires of
legislators—a desire that takes the form of the statement: “I want X to
happen.” Rather, they are presumed to be seeking the post-consolidation
understanding of legislation, an understanding that takes the form of the
statement: “I understand our consolidation to do X, and I intend to vote on
it given that understanding.”
If there is anyone who second-guesses this second act of consolidation,
ironically, it is Judge Easterbrook himself. This is revealed in his concerns
about Arrovian cycling.216 The typical cycling situation posits a set of

212. It also does not attempt to imaginatively reconstruct that act of consolidation. In this
sense, this also is a feature that distinguishes intentionalism from approaches such as Professor
Einer Elhauge’s preference-estimating approach. See Einer Elhauge, Preference-Estimating
Statutory Default Rules, 102 COLUM. L. REV. 2027, 2084 (2002). Professor Elhauge assumes
that, in cases of statutory ambiguity, actual congressional intent has run out, and interpreters
are in a blank space of judicial improvisation—i.e., “cases of hermeneutic exhaustion.” Id. In
that situation, he argues that judges should endeavor to defer to democratic will by recreating
a simulacrum of statutory intent. See id. at 2038.
213. See Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 58, at 62–65; Easterbrook, supra note 3,
at 547–48 (“The existence of agenda control makes it impossible for a court—even one that
knows each legislator’s complete table of preferences—to say what the whole body would
have done with a proposal it did not consider in fact.”); see also Manning, supra note 192, at
2406 (describing intentionalism as asking “the counterfactual question of what Congress
would have intended to do on an ambiguous point”).
214. Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 58, at 64.
215. See Easterbrook, Legislative History, supra note 198, at 445 (“What distinguishes
laws from the results of opinion polls conducted among legislators is that the laws survived a
difficult set of procedural hurdles . . . .”).
216. Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 547 (citing Arrow for the proposition that “it turns out
to be difficult, sometimes impossible, to aggregate [legislators’ preferences] into a coherent
collective choice”); Easterbrook, supra note 57, at 286–87 (discussing the utility and limits of
public choice for various areas of legal scholarship); see also WILLIAM RIKER, LIBERALISM
AGAINST POPULISM: A CONFRONTATION BETWEEN THE THEORY OF DEMOCRACY AND THE
THEORY OF SOCIAL CHOICE 115–36 (1982) (explaining the Arrovian critique); Farber &
Frickey, supra note 59, at 426–37, 453–69 (explaining the Arrovian critique while arguing
that it does not pose the suggested problems for intentionalism).
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pre-consolidation policy preferences among legislators.217 In its simplest
form, it posits the following pre-consolidation legislative desires of three
legislators (legislators one, two, and three) with respect to three policy
options (policies A, B, and C), where policies are listed in order of
descending legislator preference from left to right:
Legislator One: A  B  C
Legislator Two: B  C  A
Legislator Three: C  A  B

In this particular alignment of legislator preferences, the Arrovian critique
observes, there is no political desire that is plainly preferred to its
competitors.218 Conceived as a series of either-or choices, these legislators
would choose policy A over policy B (by a two-to-one vote), policy B over
policy C (by a two-to-one vote), and policy C over policy A (by a two-to-one
vote).219 Therefore, the legislative choice among these policies will turn on
the manner and order in which votes among competing choices are
structured, not on some deeper consensus about the preferred policy—
because, in this instance, such a consensus does not exist.220 If intentionalists
are looking to identify the stable pre-consolidation political desire of
legislators, critics therefore conclude, they are seeking something that may
not exist, at least in certain legislative situations.221
The focus on post-consolidation intent reduces these concerns about
cycling. Imagine that our hypothetical legislators, discussed above, arranged
their decision-making process in the following order: B versus C, then the
winner versus A. In this process, they would select policy A. Beneath that
legislative choice, there admittedly would be a cycling of personal
pre-consolidation policy preferences among the legislators. In other words,
if the three policy makers were asked to identify the policy that they each
individually preferred, they would have given answers that evinced cycling.
If the policy makers instead were asked to identify the policy that they voted
to approve, however, they presumably would all give the same answer:
policy A. There would not be a cycling of interpretation, in other words.
Intentionalism anchored in disaggregated-intent theory seeks the answer to
the latter question—and that is a question we have good reason to suspect
has relatively stable answers.222
This is not to say that cycling raises no concerns for intentionalism under
disaggregated-intent theory. While cycling may not undermine the viability
of the interpretive task that intentionalists perform, it does raise concerns
about the value of that task. If the second consolidation point in our
217. See generally KENNETH J. ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed.
1963).
218. See id.
219. See id.
220. See id.
221. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 547.
222. For additional discussion of the stability of interpretation within communities, see
infra Part V.B.
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legislative process truly is an arbitrary selection among policy options—the
product of procedural accidents, not legislator policy desires—then there is
no room in our system for democratic self-government, and so it is foolish to
use an interpretive method designed to promote it. Part V.B.1 will engage
more deeply with this concern.
For now, however, the primary point is this: the Arrovian critique is based
on a deep skepticism of the legislative process. It fundamentally questions
the ability of that process to consolidate legislator intentions into
nonarbitrary, much less democratically optimal, legislative products. It is
difficult to square that intense skepticism of the legislative process with the
deference to the legislative process that Judge Easterbrook simultaneously
demands. By contrast, intentionalism actually goes much further toward
realizing this Easterbrookian virtue—a fact that becomes apparent once
disaggregated-intent theory and its constitutional aims are employed to
clarify precisely the type of intent sought by intentionalism.
3. Intent Trumping Text
A final question that has plagued intentionalism asks: how far must
interpreters go in promoting intent? According to textualist critics, a rigorous
commitment to intentionalism would lead an interpreter to prioritize
legislative intent in all situations.223 This would include allowing it to trump
plain statutory text.224 The fact that intentionalists typically are reluctant to
override statutory text, critics conclude, reveals the inconsistency of the
intentionalist position—and perhaps evinces a lingering awareness among
intentionalists that their methodology is at root indefensible.225 In this
regard, intentionalism has been criticized as a methodology not in accord
with its theoretical premises.
Elsewhere, I have argued that it might indeed make sense for statutory
interpreters to allow intent to trump plain statutory text in certain narrowly
defined situations.226
Setting that aside, however:
under
223. See Antonin Scalia, Speech on Use of Legislative History 16–17 (1985–86) (transcript
on file with the Fordham Law Review); Farber & Frickey, supra note 59, at 460; see also
Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note 58, at 60–61 (“The judge rooting about in the history
of the statute assumes, in other words, that the written word is but an imperfect reflection of
the real law. The true law, the governing rule, is not down on paper; it is in the minds of the
legislators. The true rule applies no matter what the words say.”); OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, supra
note 61, at 22 (“A search for the intended meaning as opposed to the meaning that the words
actually convey denies controlling effect to the language of the statute. The language becomes
merely evidence of the legislative intent, and when better evidence is available, it presumably
must be accepted. . . . [T]his position is highly paradoxical . . . .”).
224. OFF. OF LEGAL POL’Y, supra note 61, at 22.
225. This intentionalist approach was aptly summarized by Judge Henry J. Friendly in his
description of Justice Felix Frankfurter’s methodology, which he said provided that “if an
intent clearly expressed in committee reports is within the permissible limits of the [statutory]
language and no construction manifestly more reasonable suggests itself, a court does pretty
well to read the statute to mean what the few legislators having the greatest concern with it
[i.e. the committee] said it meant to them.” HENRY J. FRIENDLY, Mr. Justice Frankfurter and
the Reading of Statutes, in BENCHMARKS 196, 216 (1967).
226. Cross, Staffer’s Error Doctrine, supra note 18, at 132–38.
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disaggregated-intent theory, there is nothing inconsistent about a brand of
intentionalism that refuses to trump the plain statutory text. This is how the
promotion of constitutional values typically operates in the domain of
statutory interpretation. In cases of statutory ambiguity, courts deploy
substantive canons of construction to resolve the ambiguity in a manner that
promotes certain constitutional values—especially structural constitutional
elements.227 In these instances, statutory interpretation operates as
“quasi-constitutional law,” as Professors William Eskridge, Jr. and Philip
Frickey put it.228 Yet these substantive canons are used to promote
constitutional values only until they bump up against limits on the plausible
meaning of statutory text.229 The promotion of democratic self-government,
itself a structural constitutional element, operates no differently.
Viewing intentionalism through this lens, where it is akin to a substantive
canon of construction, may seem odd. However, that is because interpreters
rarely stop to disentangle the various constitutional values that they promote
simply by hewing to plausible interpretations of statutory text. Two such
values already have been noted: democratic self-government and the rule of
law. Other constitutional values also are advanced by this practice, including
the provision of notice230 and the advancement of the separation of
powers.231 In relatively straightforward statutory interpretation cases, these
values are all advanced simultaneously, and they are advanced simply by
ensuring that a court’s interpretation remains within the bounds of the
permissible meanings of statutory text. In such situations, it is easy to see
why other constitutional values, such as those embodied in the substantive
canons, cannot trump plain statutory text. If they were to trump it, then the
constitutional value embodied in the substantive canon would be advanced
at the expense of the many values preserved by hewing to plausible textual
interpretations—a seemingly bad trade-off. The question that textualists
implicitly raise in their text-versus-intent hypothetical, however, is: What
should be done when the constitutional values that typically travel together
in statutory text suddenly become unbundled? What do we do when, in order
to advance democratic self-government (by hewing to legislator intentions),
we must forgo other constitutional values such as notice and separation of
powers (by contravening any plausible construction of statutory text)? In
response, intentionalists have given the eminently reasonable answer:
227. For a catalogue of these canons, see Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 161, at 597.
228. Id.
229. See Skilling v. United States, 561 U.S. 358, 423 (2010) (Scalia, J., concurring in part
and concurring in the judgment) (noting that substantive canons should be applied only when
two “fair alternatives” of statutory readings exist (quoting United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S.
41, 45 (1953))); see also ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 494 (noting that substantive canons
typically function as tiebreakers, presumptions, or clear statement rules).
230. For sources on the importance of public notice, see supra note 85 and accompanying
text.
231. Limiting statutory meaning to plausible interpretations of statutory text presumably
cabins legislative power by preventing legislatures from remaking statutory meaning without
exercising legislative power, as well as executive and judicial powers by cabining discretion
to bounds set by legislature.
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sacrifice the value of democratic self-government in that instance, just as we
often sacrifice other constitutional values that fall outside the text in statutory
construction.232
What is exceedingly odd about modern textualism, beyond its critique of
an intentionalist concession to values textualism prioritizes, is that it simply
discusses this tradeoff as though there were no constitutional value on the
other side of the ledger. It proceeds as though the sacrifice of democratic
self-government were no sacrifice at all. This is a strange way to talk about
legislation in a system in which democratic self-government arguably is the
preeminent constitutional value, and in which legislation must operate as a
central vehicle for realizing that value.
B. Intentionalism Critiques
The foregoing discussion has attempted to outline a version of
intentionalism rooted in disaggregated-intent theory and its corresponding
vision of democratic self-government. This part examines two categories of
counterarguments that might be raised to this: (1) that intentionalism only
poorly promotes democratic self-government, and therefore does not achieve
its purported goals; and (2) that while intentionalism may promote
democratic self-government, it does so at the expense of other constitutional
values that instead should have priority. In addressing these, the goal is not
necessarily to rebut each counterargument, but rather to show how
disaggregated-intent theory usefully reframes the debates surrounding them.
1. Intentionalism Poorly Promotes Self-Government
With a turn to disaggregated-intent theory, this Article has argued,
intentionalism can potentially be defended as a methodology grounded in its
capacity to advance the constitutional goal of democratic self-government.
In response, critics may argue that this goal—even if laudable—is one that
intentionalism accomplishes only poorly (or, worse, not at all). This failure
might be attributable to the fact that promoting democratic self-government
simply is impossible, or to intentionalism being a bad method of promoting
it.
As Part III explained, the constitutional vision of democratic
self-government relies on successful transfers of political will occurring at
four different transition points. For intentionalism to fail in its goal of
promoting democratic self-government, it presumably means that either
(1) a failure has occurred at one of the two antecedent transition points, and
so courts do not encounter any meaningful political will in statutes for them
to advance, or (2) intentionalism is a poor strategy for locating the political
will that is, in fact, accessible in statutes.

232. For an argument that hewing to text in these instances may better promote intent in
the long run, too, however, see Farber & Frickey, supra note 59, at 460–61.
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There are myriad ways in which failure might occur at each constitutional
transition point, and exploring every possible way is beyond the scope of this
Article. Still, it is worth examining a few possibilities.
a. Elections
First, consider the transfer point of elections. Part V.A chronicled one
sense in which this transition point, while not entirely broken, nonetheless
distorts political will in its act of transference: by inadequately committing
to proportional representation, it fails to convey political desires into
Congress in the same proportions that exist in the larger voting public.233
To a certain extent, this means that intentionalism (or any interpretive
method) unavoidably will convey a distorted political will back to the public,
as courts will interpret and apply statutes enacted by a legislature that did not
fully mirror the people. However, as Part V.A observed, interpretive method
might have some leeway to minimize or magnify these political distortions.
When assessing statements by representatives in legislative history,
intentionalists typically treat each legislator as having not only an equal vote,
but also an equal voice.234 Or, if intentionalism does prioritize certain
legislative voices, it gives greater weight to voices that are closer to the
decision-making process for a bill (e.g., bill sponsors or committee chairs),
not to voices that represent larger constituencies.235 This may be an accurate
assessment of who within Congress has the actual power to shape voting
patterns and communal interpretations—but it might also perpetuate those
power dynamics that, viewed from a democratic self-government lens, are
distorted.236
There have been scholars who have argued that, at both constitutional and
statutory levels, there is a justifiable role for courts to perform in correcting
for distortions and defects in the democratic and legislative processes.237
This raises the intriguing possibility of a form of intentionalism that, as a
method that aims to maximize democratic self-government, prioritizes the
voices and interpretations of representatives who speak for larger
constituencies.
233. See infra Part V.A.
234. For an explanation of the conventional hierarchy of legislative materials, see
ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 1, at 631.
235. See id.
236. Interestingly, there is evidence that the founders thought this power dynamic would
run in the other direction. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 58, supra note 99, at 393 (James Madison)
(“Notwithstanding the equal authority which will subsist between the two houses on all
legislative subjects, except the originating of money bills, it cannot be doubted that the house,
composed of the greater number of members, when supported by the more powerful states,
and speaking the known and determined sense of a majority of the people, will have no small
advantage in a question depending on the comparative firmness of the two houses.”).
237. See, e.g., JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST: A THEORY OF JUDICIAL
REVIEW 103 (1980) (arguing that judicial review is justified as a means of enhancing
democratic participation and representation); Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond the Republican
Revival, 97 YALE L.J. 1539, 1582 (1988) (arguing that courts are “to use interpretation to
guard against or limit [possible] malfunctions [in the legislative process]”).
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That said, if the object sought by interpreters typically is a communal
interpretation that prevailed within the legislature, then perhaps classic
intentionalism gets it correct and each legislator voice indeed is equally
useful. In these instances, a legislator viewpoint is treated not simply as an
expression of that legislator’s understanding of the legislation, but as one data
point about the prevailing interpretation in the legislature. In this regard, the
stability of interpretation within communities may mean that an intense
concern with weighing individual legislative voices is misplaced, and that
intentionalism’s tendency to regard legislators as having equal voices may
make sense as part of a strategy to use interpretation to promote democratic
self-government.238
b. Enactment
Next, consider the second constitutional transition point: the enactment of
binding laws. The foregoing sections already discussed the most prominent
argument that has been made against this transition point: the textualist
argument that Arrovian cycling prevents bill voting and enactment from
capturing any meaningful snapshot of legislator preferences.239 As Part
V.A.2 explained, this Arrovian critique does not undermine the feasibility of
intentionalism; intentionalists are seeking legislator understandings of their
post-consolidation legislative product, and those understandings are likely to
be relatively stable, even in situations of cycling.240 However, Arrovian
cycling admittedly does call into question the extent to which intentionalism,
even if it can locate those understandings, advances democratic
self-government by finding and applying them. After all, if statutes—and
legislator understandings of them—are simply the arbitrary product of
procedural factors rather than a meaningful distillation of legislators’
political preferences, then locating legislator understandings will do little to
advance any political will that legislators have carried into the legislature.
However, several scholars have argued persuasively that concerns about
Arrovian cycling may be overblown.241 And it is not evident that textualists
are willing to accept the relatively radical consequences of a thoroughgoing

238. See infra notes 248–50 and accompanying text. It also is unclear how such a
methodology would apply with respect to older statutes enacted during periods with different
population distributions.
239. See supra notes 216–22 and accompanying text.
240. See supra note 216 and accompanying text.
241. See, e.g., Arthur Lupia & Mathew D. McCubbins, Lost in Translation: Social Choice
Theory Is Misapplied Against Legislative Intent, 14 J. CONTEMP. LEGAL ISSUES 585, 588
(2005); William H. Panning, Formal Models of Legislative Processes, 8 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 427,
438–40 (1983); Farber & Frickey, supra note 59, at 429; see also Michael Laver, Legislatures
and Parliaments in Comparative Context, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL ECONOMY
121, 135 (Barry R. Weingast & Donald A. Wittman eds., 2006); John M. Carey, Legislative
Organization, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS 431, 444–47 (R.A.W.
Rhodes et al. eds., 2006); EKINS, supra note 9, at 175–76; WALDRON, supra note 63, at 89–
90.
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Arrovian critique, which essentially views meaningful democratic
self-government as impossible.242
Another critique that bears upon the second constitutional transition point
challenges the very idea of individual legislator intent.243 According to
scholars advancing this critique, the idea that legislators possess coherent
intentions is false. Consequently, any interpretive project that defines itself
as a conscious search for legislator intent is engaged in a fool’s errand.244
While an absence of individual intent does not necessarily spell the demise
of intentionalism,245 the brand of intentionalism outlined in this Article does
rely on the reality of individual intent. To those convinced by critiques of
individual legislator intent, therefore, it has little to say. Nonetheless, by
tracing the role that legislator intent is designed to play in the constitutional
scheme, this Article does raise questions about these skeptics’ vision of
democratic self-government. It seems incumbent upon these theorists to
explain how a system of democratic self-government operates in a world
devoid of intent, assuming that their contention is not that democratic
self-government is simply a fiction that has outlived its theoretical
underpinnings.
c. Interpretation
Finally, consider the third constitutional transition point: statutory
interpretation. Even if we agree that interpreters ideally should advance

242. See, e.g., RIKER, supra note 216, at 2–3 (“According to democratic theory, democratic
ends can be achieved by democratic means. Now, of course, that assertion may or may not be
true. If it is true, then the notion of democracy makes sense. But if it is not true, if the method
cannot realize the ideal, then, however lofty the ideal may be, the notion of democracy is
meaningless.”).
243. See Ronald Dworkin, Law as Interpretation, 9 CRITICAL INQUIRY 179, 197 (1982)
(“[J]ust as we noticed that a novelist’s intention is complex and structured in ways that
embarrass any simple author’s intention theory in literature, we must now notice that a
legislator’s intention is complex in similar ways.”); Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 536 (stating
that “speakers do not even have determinative intents about the meanings of their own
words”); Easterbrook, supra note 56, at 68 (“Intent is empty. Peer inside the heads of
legislators and you find a hodgepodge. . . . Intent is elusive for a natural person, fictive for a
collective body.”); Easterbrook, supra note 57, at 284 (“Any one author has a mix of
objectives, motives, desires, and concerns that we fuse together and for which ‘intent’ is a
handy label. . . . [T]he concept of ‘an’ intent for a person is fictive and for an institution
hilarious.”).
244. This work sometimes has drawn on postmodern theory—an odd source for textualists
in particular to cite, as much postmodern theory rejects the idea that texts contain stable or
determinate meanings, too. See, e.g., Easterbrook, supra note 3, at 536; see also Schacter,
supra note 190, at 602–03 (“The advent of postmodernism has further eroded the essentialist
idea that statutory language can convey clear and determinate commands. The postmodern
assault on the determinacy and transparency of meaning, with origins and reverberations well
beyond the domain of law, has struck at the heart of the essentialist account in a way more
fundamental and sweeping than anything offered by the legal realists.”).
245. The exercise of seeking legislator intent might serve benefits, even if it ultimately is a
search for something nonexistent. See, e.g., Victoria F. Nourse, Picking and Choosing Text:
Lessons for Statutory Interpretation from the Philosophy of Language, 69 FLA. L. REV. 1409,
1428 (2017) (explaining its role in counteracting biases or limiting discretion).
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democratic self-government by locating legislator intent in a statute and
giving legal effect to that intent, is intentionalism a good strategy for doing
so? Several scholars have argued that it is not.246 Under the theory of
statutory interpretation advanced in this Article, this is a valid and plausible
challenge to intentionalism.
By contrast, another textualist critique of intentionalism carries less
weight. According to this critique, intentionalism unduly relies on isolated
statements from individual legislators, and thereby takes a lone individual’s
view and irresponsibly attributes it to an entire body of legislators.247
Intentionalism thereby is viewed as a system that relies on exceedingly paltry
evidence—what just one or two people thought—and therefore is likely to
make poor guesses about the intentions of the larger legislature.
This criticism of intentionalist method overlooks a variety of reasons to
think that, when an individual legislator articulates an interpretation of a
statute, the proffered interpretation is shared by more than just the individual
legislator. First, as Professor Stanley Fish has chronicled, interpretations
tend to be relatively stable and consistent within identifiable communities.248
Rarely is there a chaos of rogue interpretations, where an interpretation is not
shared by others in the same community.249 Second, specifically with regard
to drafter or sponsor statements, we know practically that audiences
(including co-signatories) regularly defer to author understandings and
explanations of written texts; convention tells us that authors try to do
something with words, and fellow readers rely upon the authors’
246. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 97 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring);
Adrian Vermeule, Legislative History and the Limits of Judicial Competence: The Untold
Story of Holy Trinity Church, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1833, 1866 (1998) (“[T]he interaction between
distinctive features of legislative history and structural constraints of the adjudicative process
may indeed cause legislative history to reduce rather than increase judicial accuracy.”);
Nelson, supra note 32, at 372 (suggesting that “textualists are as interested as intentionalists
in enforcing the intended meaning of statutory language, and simply believe that the textualist
approach will better capture the type of intent that both camps seek”); see also Easterbrook,
supra note 56, at 67–70 (arguing that use of legislative history confers troubling discretion);
Farber & Frickey, supra note 59, at 460–61 (explaining how a presumptive “plain language”
rule accords with an emphasis on drafter intent); Wald, supra note 192, at 284 (“Justice
Scalia’s own strong, albeit undocumented, sense of the ‘reality’ of the legislative process leads
him to conclude with great confidence that judges can arrive at a ‘truer’ understanding of ‘real’
congressional intent if we shut ourselves off from all of the extrinsic materials Congress has
left in its wake when it finally enacts a bill into law.”).
247. Bergeron, 489 U.S. at 98 (“That the Court should refer to the citation of three District
Court cases in a document issued by a single committee of a single house as the action of
Congress displays the level of unreality that our unrestrained use of legislative history has
attained. I am confident that only a small proportion of the Members of Congress read either
one of the Committee Reports in question, even if (as is not always the case) the Reports
happened to have been published before the vote.”); Easterbrook, Original Intent, supra note
58, at 60 (observing and further supporting Justice Scalia’s concern that “words uttered on the
floor are more apt to reflect Quixotic views of maverick legislators than the sense of the whole
body”); Scalia, supra note 3, at 36.
248. See generally STANLEY E. FISH, IS THERE A TEXT IN THIS CLASS?: THE AUTHORITY OF
INTERPRETIVE COMMUNITIES (1980).
249. For a discussion on Congress as a community with separate, discoverable interpretive
conventions, see generally Cross & Gluck, supra note 18.
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explanations of what has been done. Put differently, written texts come with
assumptions of authorial intent that justify deference to, and prioritization of,
linguistic decisions made by the person holding the pen. Third, the rise in
complexity of federal law has led Congress to further consolidate and
delegate the development of statutory meaning to those developing statutory
text.250
All of these factors support the belief that we can reasonably project out,
at least somewhat, interpretations that we discover within Congress. Such
projections are useful, particularly within a system of intentionalism
designed to promote democratic self-government—a system where, as Part
V.A.1 explained, an interpretation is not measured against any mythical gold
standard, but rather against the competing argument that legislator intent cuts
another way. This is the nature of the judicial task—courts need to pick one
interpretation or another. In that situation, the difference between knowing
one likely influential actor’s intent and knowing none—merely speculating
based on dictionary definitions, for example—probably is significant.
2. Interpretation Should Promote Other Constitutional Values
This Article has emphasized the importance of promoting the
constitutional value of democratic self-government through statutory
interpretation. In response, critics may argue that statutory interpretation
should focus instead on advancing different constitutional values. An
awareness that legislation must also serve other values traces back to the
founders, with James Madison noting in Federalist 62:
It will be of little avail to the people that the laws are made by men of their
own choice, if the laws be so voluminous that they cannot be read, or so
incoherent that they cannot be understood; if they be repealed or revised
before they are promulged, or undergo such incessant changes that no man
who knows what the law is to-day can guess what it will be to-morrow.251

In recent years, textualists particularly have emphasized the importance of
advancing alternative values through statutory interpretation.252 And the
substantive canons typically have been understood to embody an intuition
that, in certain instances, various other constitutional values should be
promoted in statutory interpretation—values that are best realized by a
250. See Cross, Staffer’s Error Doctrine, supra note 18, at 91–110; Cross, Legislative
History, supra note 18, at 93–95.
251. THE FEDERALIST NO. 62, supra note 99, at 421 (James Madison).
252. See, e.g., supra note 85 and accompanying text (citing sources arguing for promotion
of notice); Manning, supra note 7, at 2437–38 (arguing for protection of political minorities).
Even when statutory interpreters, including textualists, look to promote the value of
self-government, meanwhile, they often do it through elaborate efforts at incentivization and
other visions of “metademocracy” rather than by simply promoting legislator understandings
and intentions. See Schacter, supra note 190, at 599; see also Breyer, supra note 14, at 863–
64 (applying an agency-like theory of democratic participation by interest groups to statutes
and statutory interpretation); Elhauge, supra note 212, at 2049–73 (outlining a theory of
preference-estimating default rules to apply in statutory interpretation akin to those used in
contract or corporate law).
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conscious turn away from legislator intent.253 It is easy to imagine that some
might contest this Article’s focus on democratic self-government, therefore,
and might instead call for a focus upon different constitutional values.
In response, several points can be made. First, it is worth noting that
intentionalism already makes a variety of compromises among competing
constitutional values. For example, our legal system forces judges to guess
at the most intent-maximizing interpretation—and to do so with relatively
little evidence—rather than permitting them to bring legislators before the
court to personally explain their intentions.254 Perhaps that is partly because
we believe that legislators would present bad evidence. Yet it also results
from a trade-off made in exchange for other constitutional values—e.g.,
preservation of legislative autonomy and secrecy and separation of powers
(by preventing the legislature from controlling implementation and
adjudication).
As previous sections explained, intentionalism similarly compromises
democratic self-government by deferring to the imperfect consolidations that
happen in the legislative process, and also by refusing to permit legislator
intent to trump plausible textual meaning, thereby balancing it against values
such as notice.255
And intentionalism further compromises this
constitutional goal in exchange for other values. For example, democratic
self-government might arguably be better promoted by a method that
attempts to align interpretation with present-day political preferences among
either legislators or the general public, rather than aligning it with enacting
legislator intentions.256 By declining to take that approach, intentionalism
perhaps makes a trade-off of democratic self-government (or, at least, a
certain version of it) in exchange for values such as protection against ex post
facto laws, protection of liberty, and promotion of deliberation. In these and
other ways, intentionalism strikes a complex balance between a variety of
competing constitutional values, rather than single-mindedly pursuing the
goal of self-government.
Nonetheless, the version of intentionalism outlined in this Article does
move the value of democratic self-government to the fore. It assumes that,
within the space of statutory interpretation, promotion of that value is
laudable. That assumption is grounded in the belief that few values are more
fundamental to the constitutional scheme than democratic

253. As Professor Larry Solan notes, “Courts also resort to a set of interpretive arguments
that do not rely upon intent. Instead, they rely on values that are thought to make a statutory
code a good one. Among them are canons of construction . . . .” Solan, supra note 15, at 471.
For a detailed discussion of the constitutional dimension of these canons, see generally
Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 161.
254. Professor Caleb Nelson sees a similar but distinct point in this refusal, viewing it as
evidence that intentionalists do not seek purely subjective intent but rather a quasi-objective
intent drawn from artificially restrained sources that is not radically different from the form of
intent textualists seek. See Nelson, supra note 32, at 359–61.
255. See supra Part III.
256. For a discussion of the possible role of contemporary values in statutory interpretation,
see generally Eskridge, supra note 4.
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self-government,257 and that the Constitution envisions statutes as the
essential vehicle for elected legislators to realize this value.258 When
statutory interpretation has the capacity to realize it, or to realize it more
completely, it seems that there are strong constitutional reasons to do so.
Instead of focusing on the maximization of self-government, textualists
have sometimes emphasized a different value: the provision of notice.259 By
aligning interpretation with “ordinary” or “plain” meaning rather than with
possibly idiosyncratic legislator interpretations, these textualists argue,
courts can empower the public to open the statute books and gain an
understanding of the laws to which they will be held accountable.260 Most
agree that, to the extent statutes can perform this function, it is valuable for
them to do so.261
However, if we are going to bring realist scrutiny to the idea of legislation
as a vehicle for legislator intention,262 then we should bring that same
scrutiny to bear upon the idea of notice. To what extent do courts’ choices
among interpretive methods genuinely alter the public’s notice of the laws?
In their book on statutory interpretation, Professor Bryan A. Garner and
Justice Antonin Scalia detail dozens of canons of interpretation.263 Does the
public actually have greater notice of those canons and of how they will be
applied to a particular statute than it does of an interpretation that might be
based in legislator intentions, even when found partly in legislative
history?264 And do textualist methods, even where they produce determinate
results, generate interpretations that align with those the general public would
anticipate? (On the latter question, recent empirical studies suggest that they
do not.265)

257. See supra Part III (outlining the democratic self-government argument).
258. See supra notes 135–38 and accompanying text.
259. See supra note 85 and accompanying text (citing sources arguing for the promotion
of notice).
260. See Bostock v. Clayton County, 140 S. Ct. 1731, 1749 (2020) (“The people are entitled
to rely on the law as written . . . .”).
261. See Doerfler, supra note 10, at 1018–19 & n.201 (noting the consensus among courts
and scholars regarding fair notice).
262. For critics advancing this argument, see supra Part I.
263. They list fifty-seven canons and interpretive principles, in addition to the thirteen
“falsities” they expose. See generally ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW:
THE INTERPRETATION OF LEGAL TEXTS (2012).
264. For a famous argument that courts always have discretion to choose between two
contradictory canons, and therefore to steer statutory cases in multiple directions, see generally
Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395 (1950). See also Victoria F.
Nourse, Two Kinds of Plain Meaning, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 997, 1000–05 (2011) (noting
multiple types of plain meaning); Kevin P. Tobia, Testing Ordinary Meaning, 134 HARV. L.
REV. 726, 772 (2020) (finding that “ordinary meaning” tools of dictionaries and corpus
linguistics regularly provide differing meanings); Eskridge & Nourse, supra note 5, at 1721–
22 (arguing that judges engage in “gerrymandering” when deciding between different
statutory canons).
265. See generally Klapper et al., supra note 5; Tobia et al., supra note 5; Tobia, supra note
264.
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Realist concerns remain even if we set the details of textualist
methodology aside. What percentage of the general public even receives its
notice of legal rules from the actual text of the laws? Modern federal law is
exceedingly complex and voluminous—and this means that statutory text
largely loses its practical ability to provide direct notice to a general
public.266 As a result, there is little leeway for a statutory interpretive method
to promote or hinder the provision of notice through statutory text.267 Once
we bring a realist skepticism to bear on the value of notice—and not simply
upon the ability of statutory interpretation to advance legislator intent—the
trade-off that intentionalism offers with respect to notice seems less stark.268
CONCLUSION
The premises of intent skepticism are debatable, and they will continue to
be debated. Even if we accept those premises, however, there are compelling
reasons for intent to remain an important element in both statutory
interpretation and legislative theory. By retaining a role for intent in our
conversations about legislation, we preserve a role in these discussions for
democratic self-governance—a core constitutional concept, and one that has
too easily fallen out of legislation discourse. In the face of these challenges,
disaggregated-intent theory provides useful conceptual solutions. It is a
theory with promise not only to move beyond the concerns of intent
skepticism, but also to move decades-old discussions about legislation in new
directions.

266. An example of one measure of statutory complexity: in the statutory drafting office
for the House of Representatives, conventional wisdom holds that it currently takes six years
to understand the statutory regime in a single subject area sufficiently well to draft laws in it.
See Cross, Staffer’s Error Doctrine, supra note 18, at 114. Members of the Senate counterpart
to this office publicly attested as early as 1965 that it takes two to three years. See Hearings
Before the J. Comm. on the Org. of the Cong., 89th Cong. 1182 (1965) (statement of John H.
Simms, Legis. Couns., U.S. Senate) (“Because of the specialized nature of the work, a new
member of the staff is of little value to the office until he has served in it for 2 or 3 years.”).
267. For those interested in providing the public with greater notice of legal regimes, a
more productive path may be to promote programs like the Affordable Care Act’s Patient
Navigator Program, which promoted individuals and organizations meant specifically to
provide “fair, accurate, and impartial” information about elements of the Act to employers,
employees, and consumers potentially impacted by the Act. See Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act of 2010 § 1311(i), 42 U.S.C. § 18031(i)(5). President Donald J. Trump
dramatically cut funding to the program, but President Joseph R. Biden has committed robust
funding for it. See Ken Alltucker, Trump Administration Slashes Funding for Obamacare
Outreach Program, USA TODAY (July 10, 2018, 9:53 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/
story/news/nation/2018/07/10/obamacare-cuts-mean-groups-have-less-sign-up-customers/
773728002/ [https://perma.cc/P2U9-2HFV]. But cf. Phil McCausland, ‘A Sea Change’:
Subsidiaries and White House Push Leads to Surge in Obamacare Sign-Ups, NBC NEWS
(May 15, 2021, 6:00 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/sea-changesubsidies-white-house-push-leads-surge-obamacare-sign-n1267466 [https://perma.cc/88SV7VQR].
268. See Nelson, supra note 32, at 367 (“[I]t is hard to believe that the textualists’ position
on legislative history really reflects special sensitivity to the goal of fair notice, because the
most widely used kinds of legislative history are now no less available to the citizenry than
the statutory texts they purport to explain.”).

